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Abstract 
This dissertation explores the construction of the subject via a relationship of power 
in two poem sequences, 'The circle game' and 'Two-headed poems', by Margaret 
Atwood. I argue that Atwood proposes a subject similar to the kind of subject found 
in psychoanalysis. Like the psychoanalytic subject, Atwood's subject is formed in 
relation to its other. This relation is essentially a power relation and can become 
unbalanced, forcing one of the two parties into a subjugated position. Atwood not 
only exposes these skewed relations of power, but also explores possible solutions for 
escaping or reconfiguring these relationships. The first chapter briefly discusses 
theories of the subject by Freud, Lacan and Kristeva. I use Hegel's dialectic between 
the 'master' and 'bondsman', and subsequent psychoanalytic and postcolonial 
applications of it, to examine the construction of the subject in terms of an other in 
Chapter 2. Postcolonial map theory and Kristeva's ideas on the abject are used to 
verbalize the divisions, but also the interactions, between the subject and its other as 
well as possibilities of escape. Chapter 3 demonstrates these power relationships, and 
their expression in cartographic terms, in 'The circle game'. In Chapter 4, I show how 
processes analogous to the eruption of poetic language into the symbolic order are 
described in the poetry. Even though these processes do not provide a clear-cut 
solution to the position of the subjected, their presence signals the possibility of 
renegotiating unbalanced relationships of power. 
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Introduction 
'Power is our environment. We live surrounded by it: it pervades everything we are 
and do, invisible and soundless, like air', writes Margaret Atwood in 'Notes on Power 
Politics (1973:7). This statement encapsulates how an exploration of power relations 
permeates most of what Atwood has written up to now in what continues to be a 
prolific writing career. Power pervades everything 'we are and do' she writes: it 
constructs the individual and it provides the motivation for his/her actions. 
This dissertation explores the construction of a subject via a relationship of power in 
some of the poetry of Atwood. Atwood proposes a subject similar to the kind of 
subject found in psychoanalysis. Like the psychoanalytic subject, Atwood's subject is 
formed in relation to its other. This relation is essentially a power relation and can 
become unbalanced, forcing one of the two parties into a subjugated position. Atwood 
not only exposes these skewed relations of power, but also explores possible solutions 
for escaping or reconfiguring the relationship. The interaction between Kristeva's 
symbolic and semiotic orders is in some ways analogous to Hegel's dialectic between 
master and slave, hence the dissertation title: Symbolic masters/Semiotic slaves. 
In the first chapter, I use theories of the subject by Freud, Lacan and Kristeva to 
explain briefly the formation of the subject in psychoanalysis. I use Hegel's dialectic 
between the 'master' and 'bondsman', and subsequent psychoanalytic and postcolonial 
applications of the dialectic, to examine the construction of the subject in terms of an 
other in Chapter 2. Postcolonial map theory and Kristeva's ideas on the abject not 
only verbalize the divisions, but also the interactions between the subject and its 
other. Chapter 2 also examines possibilities of escape suggested by map theory and 
Kristeva's theory of poetic language. Chapter 3 demonstrates these power 
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relationships, and their expression in cartographic terms, in the poem sequence 'The 
circle game' from Atwood's debut collection of poems The Circle Game (1966). Lastly, 
Chapter 4 shows how the sequence 'Two-headed poems', from the collection Two-
Headed Poems (1978), describes processes analogous to the eruption of poetic 
language, associated with the semiotic order, into the symbolic order- processes that, 
according to Kristeva, signal the possibility of escaping unbalanced relationships of 
power by transcending the Hegelian dialectic; of breaking the vicious circle of the 
power game. 
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Chapter 1 
The psychoanalytic subject: Freud, Lacan, Kristeva 
In this dissertation, psychoanalytic conceptions of subjectivity provide a useful point 
of departure for my reading of some of Atwood's poems. Because of the ability of 
psychoanalysis to present platforms of discursivity,1 psychoanalysis not only provides 
useful terms to describe the poetry, but leaves space for Atwood's poems to become 
interesting analogies for processes described in the theory and thus, in a sense, 
contribute to the theory itself. This treatment of literature and psychoanalysis is in 
keeping with Freud and Lacan's own use of literature in their work, of which Bowie 
(1987:136) writes the following: 
for both [Freud and Lacan] literature was too 
provocatively enviable to be used merely for purposes 
of corroboration or display. Literature was inside as 
well as outside the field of science; the experience of 
literature was an incitement to scientific theorising and 
a premonition of what a coherent theory might be like; 
indeed certain literary works seemed not simply to 
invite but already to be theories of mind. 
Furthermore, psychoanalysis is a useful theoretical framework when exploring the 
link between subjectivity and language, for in the past language has always been the 
tool of psychoanalysis: Anna O's talking cure. Work done by Julia Kristeva on poetic 
language, a kind of language that reveals the presence of the semiotic, a language 
order anterior to 'natural' or 'symbolic' language, suggests the transformative potential 
of language for society (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:94), while Lacan finds 'the whole 
1 Foucault talks about Freud in his influential lecture 'What is an Author?' (1969) as a 'founder of 
discursivity' ([1969] 1998:217). He suggests that, because of the nature of psychoanalysis, a continuous 
revisiting of Freud is possible, seeing that Freud's work itself creates gaps which these revisitings fill. 
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structure of language' ([1977] 2001:163) in the unconscious. On the importance of 
language to psychoanalysis, Freud writes: 
Words and magic were in the beginning one and the 
same thing, and even to-day words retain much of their 
magical power. By words one of us can give to another 
the greatest happiness or bring about utter despair [ ... ] 
Therefore let us not despise the use of words in 
psychotherapy and let us be content if we may overhear 
the words which pass between the analyst and the 
patient. ([1922] 1929:13) 
To Sadoff, the root of psychoanalysis in the nineteenth century is an attempt to 
theorize 'plausible bridges between soma and psyche, physiology and psychology' 
(1998:6). She places Freud's theory within the hysteria debate ofthe late 1800s, and 
writes that, within psychoanalysis, the body becomes the site where 'pathological 
psychical structures' are represented as physiological symptoms (Sadoff, 1998:7). 
Introducing Kristeva's work, Oliver explains that, to Kristeva, the goal of the analyst 
is to reconnect body and mind through the medium of language (in Kristeva, 
2002:xxiv). Thus, in psychoanalysis, language is seen as a tool to help navigate the 
fissure that has been theorized between the subject's body and mind since ancient 
times.2 
I The Freudian subject 
Although psychoanalysis may integrate body with mind, Freud has been hailed by 
writers on modernity as well as on postcoloniality as a decentralising agent helping to 
break down notions of a unified, rational self. 3 In his early lectures on psychoanalysis 
at the University of Vienna, Freud introduces two of his key psychoanalytic 
propositions: the presence of the unconscious and what would later become known as 
2 Porter (2003:31) writes that this split is present even in Plato's Timaeus. 
3 For example, see Butler (1994:105) and Hall (1992:286-287). 
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his drive theory. First, he writes that 'mental processes are essentially unconscious, 
and ... those which are conscious are merely isolated acts and parts of the whole 
psychic entity' ([1922] 1929:16). Second, he puts forward that 
impulses, which can only be described as sexual in both 
the narrower and the wider sense, play a peculiarly large 
part ... in the causation of nervous and mental disorders. 
Nay, more, that these sexual impulses have contributed 
invaluably to the highest cultural, artistic, and social 
achievements of the human mind. ([ 1922] 1929: 17) 
Freud challenges notions of human beings in control of their mental faculties 
purported by Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant.4 In Freud's schema, instead of 
being able to rely on your own reason, you are at the mercy of unknown, unconscious 
impulses. The psychology of errors Freud writes about reduces the subject's sense of 
control to an illusion. Freud writes: 'you have an illusion of psychic freedom within 
you which you do not want to give up. I regret that on this point I find myself in 
sharpest opposition to your views' ([1922] 1929:38). Even if the subject does attempt 
to control tendencies from interfering with intentions, these tendencies assert 
themselves in other ways, for example in slips of tongue. As for the subject's 
'personality', this is made up of different parts, some of which remain unknown to 
him/her. The 'I' we refer to, is in actual fact only the conscious part of the ego in 
Freud's topology ofid, ego and super-ego and is nothing but the outcome ofvariations 
of events that took place during the subject's movement through the different stages 
in Freud's psycho-sexual theory, the most important being the phallic stage in which 
Oedipalization occurs (Freud [ 1905] 1977: 149). Concealment of some psychological 
tendencies by different parts of the subject from other parts establishes a theme of 
4 To Kant, Enlightenment is 'man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage'- nonage being 'one's 
inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance' (Kant, [1784] 2004:1}. Kant takes 
as motto for the Enlightenment the following: 'Have the courage to use your own understanding' 
(Kant, [1784] 2004:1}. 
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self-deception. Freud writes that 'tendencies of which a speaker knows nothing can 
express themselves through him' ([1922] 1929:51). Finally, the body becomes a site on 
which the subject's psychology is inscribed in complex ways. Physical symptoms 
represent psychological processes and problems. 
The implications of psychoanalysis for language are visible at the most basic level: 
Freud claims that we are no longer in control of what we say nor do we say what we 
mean. Moreover, the mistakes we make are clues to what we actually mean (Freud, 
[1922] 1929:27, 34). Thus, in psychoanalysis, language becomes revealing; a tool of 
complex meaning, since errors have their own meaning. The subject's ability to 
control his/her expression is questioned. 
It is clear that the subject Freud implies is vastly different from the Enlightenment 
self who makes (public) use of his 'reason in all matters' (Kant [1784] 2004:1). It is a 
subject whose coherence is challenged in language and being. 
II Lacan's sense of the subject and how it is formed 
Subsequent work done by Lac an continues to question the coherence of the subject. 
Hall explains that, to Lacan, 'the image of the self as "whole" and unified is something 
which the infant only gradually, partially, and with great difficulty, learns 
(1992:287). The subject, therefore, is nothing but a socio-historical effect(Grosz, 
1990:184).5 
The subject learns to view itself as a unit in what Lacan terms the mirror stage in 
identity formation. He writes that the mirror stage 'is a drama ... which 
manufactures for the subject ... the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
5 Also see Meyer, Moore and Viljoen (1997:246). 
6 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality' ((1977] 2001:5). During the mirror 
stage, the infant sees or imagines itself reflected, either in a mirror or metaphorically 
in the image of its primary caregiver. The mirror stage is an identification with an 
image; a 'transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image' 
(Lacan, (1977] 2001:1). Thus, initially experiencing its body as fragmented, the infant 
misrecognizes the mother as a reflection of its own image and so overcomes its sense 
of being fragmented (Weedon, 1991:121). To Lacan, this primary identification will 
influence all other secondary identifications ((1977] 2001:2). 
The mirror stage takes place in the imaginary, one of Lacan's three orders (the other 
two orders being the symbolic and the real) (Meyer, Moore & Viljoen, 1997:248-252). 
In the imaginary, identification takes place via an image -the perceived image of the 
self in the reflection of the Other. Lacan uses the capitalized Other to signify this 
reflected self in the mirror. 
During the mirror stage the infant views its mother as part of itself, she is not an 
other, but the Other. According to Lacan, recognizing the 'I' in the mirror is the start 
of the imaginary 'I' (expressed as the French moi). To Lacan, the Oedipal phase 
propels the child from the imaginary into the next order, the symbolic ((1977] 
2001:6). He refers to this development from the imaginary through the Oedipal phase 
to the symbolic as the metaphor of the father. During the Oedipal phase, the child 
identifies with the mother's object of desire, symbolized by the phallus. The child 
tries to replace that which the mother lacks. A replacement of this lack would 
however constitute incest. Lacan refers to the law of the father as the rule against 
incest (Lacan, (1977] 2001:73). This law is expressed in the father's arrival via the 
word, the expression of the law. Expressing this law, therefore, is referred to as the 
name of the father (le nom duper e) (La can, [ 1977] 2001:7 4). If the child replaces its 
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identification with the mother's phallus with the name of the father, it identifies with 
the rules of culture. This symbolic identification creates the symbolic 'I' (expressed as 
the French ;e, as opposed to the imaginary 'I', moi). Oedipalization revokes the 
symbiotic unit between mother and child. During the mirror stage, the child 
recognized the mother as the Other, now the child recognizes the other. The child 
has moved from identifying with an image in the imaginary to identifying with a 
word - his/her name. Lacan writes that the subject is the 'slave' of language or a 
discourse 'in which his place is already inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his 
proper name' ([1977] 2001:163). By learning to speak, the child breaches the gap 
between itself and surrounding objects. Language is used to negotiate these 
relationships with objects and with the self. The birth of the symbolic I is thus the 
birth of self-consciousness as well as the unconscious, according to Lacan (Ragland-
Sullivan, 1986:xv). Unlike Freud's, Lacan's unconscious is the 'memory space created 
by human language in compensation for separation from the mother and reinforced at 
the behest of the father' (Ragland-Sullivan_, 1986:57). 
The importance that La can gives to language can therefore not be overemphasized. To 
him, language is the only tool available for the subject to attempt a breach of the 
chasm left by the separation with the mother.6 Language is the content of the 
unconscious. Lacan views the unconscious as a place containing words and sounds, 
although 'unconscious "meaning" may be assonantal, homophonic, or may combine 
an image, object, or person' (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986:xvi). 
6 Lacan 'saw language as the conscious means by which individuals learn to master the early trauma of 
separation through the process of naming, thereby representing themselves as totalizable (Ragland-
Sullivan, 1986:xv). 
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III Kristeva' s subject-in -process 
Julia Kristeva continues to explore this relationship between subject and language in 
works such as La Revolution du langage poetique (1974), translated as Revolution in 
Poetic Language(1984). To Kristeva, the work done by modem linguistics removed 
the subject from language so that it mostly 'lack[ed] a subject' (1984:21). However, 
Kristeva believes that 'every language theory is predicated upon a conception of the 
subject that it explicitly posits, implies, or tries to deny' ([1975] 2002:93). Thus, as 
soon as there is 'consciousness of signification', a 'definite subject' is always present 
([1975] 2002:93). In Desire in Language(1980), Kristeva sets out to examine and 
refute two types of subjects implied, posited or denied by waves of linguistic thought. 
She posits a third type of subject, the subject-in-process/on trial (Je sujet en proces), 
which is based on a theory of language she developed to take into account the 
incidence of 'poetic language'7 in French avant-garde literature, which '[had awoken] 
our attention to this undecidable character of any so-called natural language' ([1975] 
2002:103). 
Kristeva extends our conception of language as a tool for communication to include 
poetic language: a 'signifying practice' which is an 'unsettling process - when not an 
outright destruction- of the identity of meaning and speaking subject' ([ 1975] 
2002:93-94). In his introduction to Revolution in Poetic Language, Roudiez explains 
that Kristeva sees poetic language as a kind of language 'that stands for the infinite 
possibilities of language, and all other language acts are merely partial realizations of 
the possibilities inherent in "poetic language" ' (in Kristeva, 1984:2). Poetic language 
is, for example, what makes literature something other than knowledge. Literature 
becomes the site 'where social code is destroyed and renewed' (Kristeva, [1975] 
2002:101). 
7 The term is borrowed from Russian Formalism. 
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The nature of Kristeva's theorizing of the signifying process explains the reason for 
her belief that her language theory implies a subject-in-process. The theory proposes 
that the signifying process comprises two modalities, the semiotic and the symbolic, 
whose dialectical interaction brings forth signification and constitutes the subject 
(1984:23-24). Furthermore, the dialectic between these two modes determines the 
kind of discourse that the signification would bring about, whether it be narrative, 
theory, poetry or any other discourse. A signifying system that is exclusively semiotic 
is said to be music (Kristeva, 1984:23-24). Language therefore supports different ways 
for the semiotic and symbolic to be articulated. Chapter 4 of this study will 
consequently attempt to examine the dialectic between these two modalities with 
reference to Atwood's poem sequence 'Two-headed poems'. 
To explain what she means by the semiotic, Kristeva uses Freud's drive theory: she 
writes that '[d]iscrete quantities of energy move through the body of the subject who 
is not yet constituted as such and, in the course of his development, they are arranged 
according to the various constraints imposed on this body- always already involved 
in a semiotic process- by family and social structures' (1984:25). The constraints she 
refers to involve the splitting of the child from its mother during Oedipalization. By 
the semiotic, therefore, Kristeva means 'the primary organization (in Freudian terms) 
of drives by rhythms, intonations and primary processes (displacement, slippage, 
condensation). Genetically, the semiotic is found in the first echolalias of infants' 
(1985:216). Thus, drives involve 'semiotic functions and energy discharges' that 
orientate and connect the pre-Oedipal child's body to its mother ([1975] 2002:104). 
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In Kristeva's system, the drives 'articulate' a chora, an almost womb-like metaphoric 
space8 anterior to 'normal' language. She writes that the chora is a 'nonexpressive 
totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement 
as it is regulated' (1984:25). The term comes from the Timaeuswhen Plato invokes 'a 
state of language anterior to the word, even to the syllable, and calls this the chora, 
the receptacle, the place before the space which is always already named, one, 
paternal, sign and predication' (Kristeva, 1985:217). The chora is the seat of the 
semiotic, and even though the semiotic forms part of the signifying process, within 
the chora it does not try to create definite meaning or to signify (Kristeva, [ 1975] 
2002:101). Instead it is continuously transformative: it moulds, creates, ebbs and flows 
with its own internal rhythm. 
Kristeva explains that, although the chora is without unity, identity or deity in Plato's 
sense, it is, however, subject to a process of regulation. This regulatory process 
'effectuates discontinuities by temporarily articulating them and then starting over, 
again and again' (1984:26), giving the chora a regenerative, but also annihilatory, 
quality. 
The semiotic does not disappear once the child has experienced Oedipalization but 
remains anterior to 'natural language' and functions as a 'supplementary register to 
that of sign and predication' in all adult discourses (Kristeva, 1985 :217). Moreover, 
poetic language exposes the presence of the semiotic which disturbs language and 
threatens meaning with its 'heterogeneousness'. Kristeva ([ 1975] 2002:101) writes 
about this 'heterogeneousness' of poetic language: 
8 Ward (1994:114) refers to the difficulty in using a concept such as the chora, which essentially refers 
to something that cannot be expressed in language: 'For propositions about such areas to be spoken of, 
or illustrated, they have to be articulated metaphorically, gestured towards in a quasi-mythic structure, 
in which a surface of denotation covers a deeper area of inarticulate structures'. 
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detected ... as rhythms and intonations anterior to the 
first phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, and sentences; this 
heterogeneousness, which is later reactivated as rhythms, 
intonations, glossalalias in psychotic discourse, serving as 
ultimate support of the speaking subject threatened by 
the collapse of the signifying function ([1975] 2002:101)9 
Thus, it is possible to look for instances in language where the semiotic breaks into 
the symbolic and threatens its signifying structure. Chapter 4, therefore, will also 
show how 'Two-headed poems' express a wish for these instances. 
The second modality that comprises the signifying process in Kristeva's system, the 
symbolic, is similar to the symbolic of Lacan. Kristeva writes that 'the symbolic is a 
matter ... of language as a system of meaning' (Kristeva, 1985:217). In order for the 
future speaker to enter into the symbolic, in other words into signification and 
meaning, the child must break away from the mother and repress certain instinctual 
drives (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:104). To the pre-Oedipal child, the mother's body is a 
site that 'mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the 
ordering principle of the semiotic chora' (Kristeva, 1984:27). The body of the mother 
was a mediator or go-between, but with the child's movement to the symbolic 
(Lacan's metaphor of the father), language as symbolic function can now only 
constitute itself by repressing the child's continuous relation to the mother and to 
instinctual drives. What is more, a return to the pre-symbolic would constitute incest 
- incest being prohibited by Lacan's law of the father. However, to Kristeva, poetic 
language signals a return to the pre-symbolic, and by implication, to the body of the 
mother, a return which is the 'equivalent of incest' (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:104). This 
9 In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva sites Mallarme's Le My stere dans les lettres in its entirety 
to focus attention on 'the semiotic rhythm within language' (1984:29). She writes that 'indifferent to 
language, enigmatic and feminine, this space underlying the written is rhythmic, unfettered, 
irreducible to its intelligible verbal translation; it is musical, anterior to judgment, but restrained by a 
single guarantee: syntax' (1984:29). 
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would explain the uncertainty or revulsion with which utterances of poetic language, 
like glossalalias in psychotic discourse, are met with in society- the disgust is the 
disgust of incest. 
Kristeva writes that '[b ]ecause the subject is always both semiotic and symbolic, no 
signifying system he produces can be either "exclusively" semiotic or "exclusively" 
symbolic, and is necessarily marked by an indebtedness to both' (1984:24). The 
presence of poetic language leads her to posit the subject, suggested by her theory of 
language, as follows: 
[ i ]t is poetic language that awakens our attention to this 
undecidable character of any so-called natural language, 
a feature that univocal, rational, scientific discourse 
tends to hide - and this implies considerable 
consequences for its subject. [ ... ] It is true that there 
would unavoidably be a speaking subject since the 
signifying set exists, it is nonetheless evident that this 
subject, in order to tally with its heterogeneity, must be, 
let us say, a questionable subject-in-process ([1975] 
2002:103). 
It is clear that Kristeva's subject-in-process is a variation on Freud and Lacan's notions 
of a modern subject who is split or fragmented and very different from the 
Enlightenment self. Atwood's sometimes graphic depictions of body-mind separations 
can be said to be symptomatic of this breakdown of a coherent identity. What is 
more, Atwood's subject often finds herself in a state of subjection. Atwood takes issue 
with this power imbalance because she wants to assert the relevance of art in both a 
social and political context (Rigney, 1987:1). Rigney writes that, to Atwood, writers 
must not only describe the world, but also criticize it. The role of the artist is to 'bear 
witness to its failures, and ... to prescribe corrective measures - perhaps even to 
redeem' (1987:1). Kristeva's theory of poetic language is relevant here: because poetic 
language is an 'unsettling process', this type of signifying practice 'accompanies crises 
13 
within social structures and institutions -the moments of their mutation, evolution, 
revolution, or disarray' (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:93-94). Poetic language becomes the 
code for not only a 'mutation within language', but also within 'institutions' (Kristeva, 
[1975) 2002:94). Kristeva therefore assigns a transformative power to this type of 
language. Moreover, she views crises in language and society as 'inherent in the 
signifying function' and in 'sociality'. Similar to Atwood, who advocates a kind of 
committed literature, Kristeva wants these crises, which she sees at the vanguard of 
contemporary politics, to be addressed by 'the so-called human sciences' in order for 
these sciences to remain ethically sound ([1975] 2002:94). This is why she claims that 
her semiotic-symbolic signifying system searches 'within the signifying phenomenon 
for the crisis or the unsettling process of meaning and subject rather than for the 
coherence or identity of either one or a multiplicity of structures' ([1975] 2002:94). 
These claims are significant for an author such as Atwood who works to expose and 
explore the subjection of people. However, in psychoanalysis, subjectivity is 
intimately related to subjection. The next chapter will explore this link in more detail. 
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Chapter 2 
The subject and subjection 
I The subject in relation to an other: Hegel's master-slave dialectic 
'No subject comes into being without power', writes Judith Butler in The Psychic Life 
of Power: Theories in Subjection (1997:15) in which she explores how the subject is 
formed by being subjected to the power of another. In the psychoanalytic notions of 
subjectivity reviewed in the previous chapter, the infant is subjected to its parents, 
seeing that it is completely dependent on them for its basic needs. Butler argues that 
this subjection is needed for the infant to become a subject. Psychoanalysis therefore 
proposes a subject constructed in relation to others. This relation is essentially a 
power relation. 
Implied in this notion of subjectivity is Hegel's ideas on 'lordship' and 'bondage' 
developed in ThePhenomenologyofSpirit(1807) . Lacan comments on the 
importance of Hegel's master-slave dialectic. He writes: 'Hegel had provided the 
ultimate theory of the proper function of agressivity in human ontology, seeming to 
prophecy the iron law of our time. From the conflict of Master and Slave, he deduced 
the entire subjective and objective progress of our history' (Lacan, [1977] 2001:29). 
Many French thinkers in the 1930s viewed this dialectic as a counter to Kant's 
rationalism, which based identity on reason (Gikandi, 2004: 103). Thus, when Hegel 
wrote that '[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged' ([1807] 1977:111), he 
displaced the subject to a position in which its subjectivity depended on the dialectic 
between itself and an other. 
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Hegel's schema is a double-edged sword: when the subject is faced with its other, it 
loses itself, for it is in an other being, and has to cancel this other in order to become 
itself. However, its denying or 'superseding' of the other supersedes itself, 'for this 
other is itself (Hegel, [1807] 1977:111).10 This process is reciprocal in that the other is 
also a self in relation to its other. 
Hegel explains that mere existence, '[just] being' ([1807] 1977:114), is not the essential 
nature of self-consciousness - every self-consciousness needs to prove itself as 
independent from every other. 11 A struggle between the self and the other ensues 
where each one seeks to dominate the other. It is a 'trial by death' (Hegel, [1807] 
1977:114), and each of these parties struggle against death, the negation of 
consciousness. Hegel writes that 'they leave each other free only indifferently', if they 
'do not reciprocally give and receive one another back from each other consciously' 
(Hegel, [1807] 1977:114). In the words of Roth (in Gikandi, 2004:103): 'The loser of 
the struggle is the one who decides that life is more important than the recognition 
originally sought. This person abandons the fight and is made a slave who recognizes 
the sovereignty of the master. In other words, the loser allows the animal desire for 
self-preservation to take precedence over the human desire for recognition.' 12 
Being present in psychoanalytical theories, Hegel's dialectic has also been espoused in 
postcolonial and feminist theories, seeing that these discourses are interested in 
relations of power, be it between the colonized and colonizer or between women and 
men. Power relations become a common denominator linking feminist and 
10 Baillie's translation uses the term 'sublate' (Hegel, [1807]1949:229). 
11 Hegel writes: 'They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for 
themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case' ([1807]1977:114). 
12 According to Hegel: 'one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, 
the other is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another' 
([1807] 1977: 115). 
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postcolonial discourses,I3 as for example in work done by Bahri (2004) and Garuba 
(2002), and a reading of Atwood's poems needs to be informed by both feminist 
theories and theories on postcoloniality since her work constructs its subjects in 
relation to others, as psychoanalysis would have it, and explores the subjection of one 
subject by another, a concern postcolonialism shares with feminism. To Atwood, 'one 
power game is like another', writes McCombs (1988:146). In my reading of Atwood's 
poetry in Chapters 3 and 4, I will therefore focus on the unequal distribution of power 
between the self and the other, be it between men and women or between colonizer 
and colonized. Since every object is also a subject, for this thesis, the term 'subjects' 
refers to men or women, to those who colonize and to those who are colonized. 
Butler's notion of the subject as 'a structure in formation' (1997:10) rather than a 
person or individual reminds one that a 'subject' can mean many things. This does not 
negate the fact that women writing from the colonies may be 'othered' twice: firstly, 
in terms of belonging to a colony, rather than to the empire or Western 'centre' (in 
African literatures, race would frequently be used as an indicator of this 'otherness'), 
and secondly, in terms of gender (Bahri, 2004). 
13 In her book, The Second Sex (1953), Simone de Beauvoir alludes to the link between what is now 
considered postcolonial notions of self and other, and feminist frarnings of man and woman when she 
writes about the reciprocity of the self-other relationship. She writes: 'The native travelling abroad is 
shocked to find himself in turn regarded as a "stranger" by the natives of the neighbouring countries' 
([1953]1983:17) and goes on to ask why this reciprocity has not been recognized between men and 
women. To Gikandi on the other hand, colonialism became 'the most dramatic modern example' of 
Hegel's dialectic (2004: 103). 
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II The subject as an organism in space - Lacan 
Bahri' s point is an important one because it implies a link between subjectivity and 
geographical (or imagined)l4 space. Your subject position is determined by where you 
are physically. Although psychoanalysis frames the subject in relation to the other, 
Lacan also writes about the subject and its relation to space. To Lacan, the subject, as 
an organism in space, is mapped socially and brought on by the possibility of finding 
itself mirrored in the other (Lacan, [1977] 2001:30). 15 This is in keeping with the 
dynamics of Lacan's mirror stage. To move to the symbolic order, the forming subject 
needs to imagine its body as separate from its mother. In order for the self to locate 
the other, it would need to know its own borders- the edges where it ends and the 
other begins. Writing on Hegel's dialectic, Lacan therefore emphasizes the extent to 
which the two struggling parties express their battle in what he terms 'the vertigo of 
the domination of space' (Lacan, [1977] 2001:31). 
III Kristeva's abject 
Kristeva's notion of abjection is in a sense similar to Lacan's ideas on the subject in 
space, seeing that it examines the necessary separations that need to take place in 
order for the subject to be construed as such (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:225). In order 
for the infant to separate from its mother it needs some sort of impetus. For Freud and 
14 Salman Rushdie talks of 'imaginary homelands'- showing that one's idea of one's place of origin is a 
fiction (Gikandi, 1996:195). 
15 Lacan writes: 
the individual's relation to a particular spatial field is . . . 
mapped socially, in a way that raises it to the category of 
subjective membership. I would say that it is the subjective 
possibility of the mirror projection of such a field into the 
field of the other that gives human space its originally 
'geometrical' structure, a structure that I would be happy to 
call kaleidoscopic. 
Such, at least, is the space in which the imagery of the 
ego develops, and which rejoins the objective space of reality. 
(Lacan, [1977] 2001:30) 
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Lacan, fear of castration provides this motivation to the infant. However, Kristeva 
maintains, in contrast to Freud and Lacan, that separation begins prior to the mirror 
or Oedipal stages and that not only parental threats, but also parental love help the 
infant wean successfully and so enter the symbolic, the realm of language (Oliver, in 
Kristeva, 2002:xxi-xxii). Kristeva views the mother's body as abject before it becomes 
the infant's first object (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:226). The child's response to its 
experience of the maternal body as abject results in its separation from it. 
Kristeva's ideas on the separations needed to form subjects apply to national or 
societal identity as well (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:225). Similar to De Beauvoir, who 
extends Hegel's dialectic to include relations between men and women (De Beauvoir, 
[1953] 1983:17), Kristeva equates the separation between mother and infant with the 
separation between a foreigner and his/her mother (Kristeva, [1989] 2002:267), 
his/her motherland or his/her mother-tongue (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:226). 
Abjection is experienced in a complex way. Semetsky writes that it may bring about 
'unspeakable horror' and that it is often expressed physically through vomiting 
(2005:3). In Powers of Horror (1982), Kristeva explains that 'the abject is not an ob-
ject facing me, which I name or imagine ... [ w ]hat is abject is not my correlative, 
which, providing me with someone or something else as support, would allow me to 
be more or less detached and autonomous' (Kristeva, [1980] 2002:230). The abject is 
also not only that which is unclean or disgusting, an 'image of Death' (Kristeva, [ 1989] 
2002: 197) from which to recoil, but that which 'calls into question borders and 
threatens identity' (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:225). Kristeva writes: 'It is thus not lack 
of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. 
What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the 
composite' ([1980] 2002:232). The abject is that which collapses meaning. It is an 
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awareness of this uncertain borderline between the maternal body and the infant that 
leads to its primary experience of abjection. 16 In Semetsky's words: 'When the 
distinction- it being either between subject and object, or self and other, or life and 
death, or any habitual opposites for that matter - is destroyed, then the abjection 
takes its place' (2005:3). To the infant, this experience proves both fascinating (or 
pleasurable) and terrifying at the same time (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:225). 
It is apparent that Kristeva's abject is in a sense opposite to the slave in Hegel's 
dialectic: instead of supplying some sort of correlative, some mirror image for the 
subject to be perceived as subject, the abject draws one 'toward the place where 
meaning collapses' (Kristeva, [ 1980] 2002:230). Borders supply meaning. Being 
without borders implies not being and causes fear - 'How can I be without border?' 
asks Kristeva ([1980] 2002:231)- a point which Mandel (1983:57) echoes when he 
mentions 'the threat of unstructured or unmapped space' present in Atwood. 
IV Borders and maps 
Edges or borders between the colonizer and colonized and between men and women 
feature prominently in Atwood's poetry as Chapters 3 and 4 will point out. 
Postcolonial theories on maps as visual representations of the borders between spaces 
and thus between subjects are useful when exploring these borders. 
In map theory, colonial cartography is taken to mean more than a physical plotting of 
the borders of a colony on paper. Maps implied ownership of the land and of the 
people inhabiting it and provided structure to a wilderness that had to be 'tamed'. 
Theorists such as Huggan (1989) pick apart maps to expose the cartographer/ 
colonizer's representation of his own superiority and dominant position. A map, 
16 
'The border has become an object' writes Kristeva ([1980]2002:231). 
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therefore, says just as much about subjectivity as it does about space, and cartographic 
discourse provides useful concepts to apply to the psychic borderlines of which 
Kristeva speaks when she talks about the abject. 
Gamba (2002: 105) explains that within colonialist (and patriarchal) discourses the 
subject's body (as representative of the whole individual- body, mind and emotions) 
is figured as land and the subject's land as body. 17 Maps classified, enumerated and 
described the subjected and represented the identities projected onto the colonized, 
which chained subjects to fixed subject positions. Maps therefore become the 
thumbprints left behind by the Hegelian dialectic. They are symbols that expose the 
struggle between master and slave, and cartography becomes a metaphor for the 
framing of the other as other. To H uggan ( 1989: 117), maps are manifestations of the 
cartographer/colonialist's desire for control: 'the "reality" represented mimetically by 
the map not only conforms to a particular version of the world but to a version which 
is specifically designed to empower its makers' (1989:118). He writes that writers 
from ex-colonies are fascinated by both the physical and metaphorical map, the 
physical map as a tool for implementing the colonialist project, the metaphorical map 
17Garuba writes of a colonialist obsession 
anchored to the body as the ultimate sign upon which racist and 
sexist discourses are founded. Since the body "presents itself' as 
a natural category, complete and united by its own boundaries, 
it is often made to function within these discourses as the model 
of a naturalised form of self and identity formation. Transferred 
thus to the colonialist context, the land is figured as a body and 
vice versa and they become the "ground" on which identity 
"grows". (2002:105) 
Writing on the colonizer's experience of boundaries set by him in Graham Greene's travel book, 
Journey Without Maps(l936) , Garuba writes: 
The boundary is distinct because the contesting narrative of 
local experience has been displaced or suppressed and a new 
hegemonic narrative signified in the European map has been 
written over it. (2002:95) 
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an example or 'framework' for a critique of the discourse of colonialism (Huggan, 
1989:115). 
V Rhetorical strategies in cartography analogous to subjection 
Huggan (1989:115) names certain rhetorical strategies used in mapmaking that 
provide an analogue for acquiring, managing and reinforcing power. One of these 
strategies, which Gamba suggests could refer to the subjugation of bodies as well 
(Gamba, 2002:105), is enclosure. This concept is useful when describing power 
relations between two subjectivities and Atwood explores this strategy in 'The circle 
game' as Chapter 3 will show. 
What does it mean when the colonizer encloses the colonized or when the master 
hems in the slave? The first implication would be that of ownership: the colonized are 
similar to cattle, owned by a farmer, put into camps on land which the farmer owns as 
well. Enclosure also keeps you from moving around freely and this denial of 
'migrations of the subject' formed a basis for colonial mapping (Gamba, 2002:87). The 
South African pass book is a case in point. 
The enclosure of the colonized not only prevents physical movement, but implies that 
his/her subjectivity can somehow be captured or represented as the colonizer pleases. 
Huggan writes that, just as the other is enclosed in spaces on the map, the other is 
fixed in (fetishized) stereotype and 'discriminatory classification' (1989:117). Writing 
on Atwood, Mandel (1983:56) identifies a primary movement in Atwood 'through a 
series of journeys, either inward or downward'. Containing the subject would police 
these journeys. 
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Garuba (2002:89) mentions another rhetorical strategy identified by Harley, namely 
'silences', which Garuba defines as 'little omissions or significant exclusions of 
material which may undermine the supposed objectivity of the map'. On many 
colonial maps, the local villages or peoples were omitted. Garuba writes that this 
textual 'emptying [of] territories and [creation of] virgin lands waiting for European 
penetration is a well-worn colonialist strategy' (Gamba, 2002:93). This is the 
cartographic equivalent of the Hegelian superseding of the other within the dialectic. 
Not only does the colonizer empty the land, he repopulates it with preconceived 
subjects. Writing on Graham Greene's Journey Without Maps in which Greene states 
that '[w]here the English map is content to leave a blank space, the American in large 
letters fills it with the word "Cannibals" ', Gamba explains that the 'projection of 
fantasies of savagery and cannibalism upon unknown territories' is another colonialist 
strategy (Gamba, 2002:93). The colonized was seen as dangerous, and regarded with 
fear and fascination - the colonized collapsed meaning. Here, the colonized is abject 
and, because of his reaction (which is similar to the infant reacting to the abject of the 
maternal body), the colonizer is infant. 
VI Why subject to the master? 
Hegel maintains that the slave succumbs to the master because he/she gets forced to 
choose between life and recognition and chooses to relinquish recognition. This 
submission is brought about by fear of death. The slave is 'seized with dread' (Hegel, 
[1807] 1977:117). In Baillie's translation, Hegel calls death 'the sovereign master' 
(Hegel, [1807] 1949:237).18 
18 Butler writes that 'the desire to survive, "to be," is a pervasively exploitable desire ... "I would rather 
exist in subordination than not exit" is a formulation of this predicament (where the risk of "death" is 
also possible)' (1997:7). 
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Lacan ([1977] 2001:31) proposes that fear of bodily harm, rather than death, is the 
impetus for taking on the slave position. 19 Thus, this fear of bodily harm could be used 
to explain the subjection of women and the colonized in feminist and postcolonial 
theory respectively. The colonizer, with military force, did make slaves of the 
colonized in a very real sense. Lacan's theory would imply that the threatening 
presence of the physically stronger male forces the female to subject to him. 
Kristeva's notion of abjection provides another possible reason for the subjugation of 
women. In Black Sun: Depression and Melancholy(1989), she explains that it is 
necessary, both biologically and psychically, for the forming subject to lose its mother 
in order for it to become autonomous, to be construed as subject ([1989] 2002:197). In 
other words, the infant needs to experience its mother as abject. It must make of its 
mother something from which to recoil (Kristeva, [1989] 2002:197). However, if the 
infant is female, she is unable to abject the maternal body, seeing that she identifies 
with the mother as a woman: 'how can She be that bloodthirsty Fury, since I am She 
(sexually and narcissistically), She is I?' asks Kristeva ([1989] 2002:198). Thus, the 
hatred the girl infant feels towards the mother is internalized - she feels inferior and 
is therefore prone to take on the lesser role. In Tales of Love (1987), Kristeva also 
suggests 'misplaced abjection' as a possible explanation for the oppression of women 
(Oliver, 1998:3). In her argument, she explores what some would argue to be the most 
important image of woman in the West - that of the Virgin Mary, to find her reduced 
to mother only. In patriarchal cultures, therefore, women have been reduced to the 
function of procreation only, and Western images of the mother do not allow her to 
function as a 'speaking social being' (Oliver, in Kristeva, 2002:297). Because of this 
reduction, all of Woman settles in the maternal body. When the maternal body is 
19 According to Lacan 'the fear of death, the "absolute Master", presupposed in consciousness by a 
whole philosophical tradition from Hegel onwards, is psychologically subordinate to the narcissistic 
fear of damage to one's own body' (Lacan, [1977] 2001:31). 
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abjected, women, maternity and femininity are abjected along with it (Oliver, 
1998:3). Throwing the baby out with the bathwater is a fitting idiom to describe this 
process. In Atwood, however, there is a constant preoccupation with the redefinition 
of the mother (Rigney, 1987:4) and she shares Kristeva's reconfiguring of the way in 
which society sees maternity. 
As I have indicated in the opening of this chapter, Butler explains that the subject is 
complicit in its own subordination. She writes: 'a subject is not only formed in 
subordination, but ... this subordination provides the subject's continuing condition 
of possibility.' (1997:8). One therefore not only requires recognition, but needs to be 
subordinated to become a subject. 
VII What is the subjected's way out? 
Butler is clear that 'no historical or logical conclusions' should follow from the 
subject's primary complicity in its own subjection (1997: 17). Needing to be subjected 
to form into a subject does not mean the vindication of abuses ofpower.20 
Looking at how Atwood constructs subjectivity and explores subjection in her poetry, 
one finds plans for possible liberation often expressed in cartographic terms. Map 
theory can therefore be used to describe this revolution in the language of maps and 
borders. Huggan (1989:120) writes that 'cartographic discourse can be seen to play an 
exemplary role not only in the demonstration of the empowering strategies of 
colonialist rhetoric but in the unwitting exposure of the deficiencies of these 
20 Butler maintains: 
If one is to oppose the abuses of power (which is not the same 
as opposing power itself), it seems wise to consider in what 
our vulnerability to the abuse consists. That subjects are 
constituted in primary vulnerability does not exonerate the 
abuses they suffer; on the contrary, it makes all the more 
clear how fundamental the vulnerability can be. (1997:20) 
25 
strategies'. As was mentioned before, to many writers, as is the case with Atwood, the 
map becomes a framework for criticizing the colonialist project (Huggan, 1989:115). 
But is it possible to reverse an uneven power relation or even to equalize it? 
Returning to the map as metaphor of subjection, Garuba proposes that 'strategies of 
escape' (Garuba, 2002:88) are indeed possible, seeing that 'the regulatory operations of 
cartographic discourse and, by analogy, .. . the stabilizing rhetoric of colonial 
discourse, neither guarantees the effectiveness of colonial rule nor ensures the 
coherence of the discursive system which underwrites it' (Huggan, 1989: 118). Butler 
echoes this when she writes that the 'social categorizations that establish the 
vulnerability of the subject to language are themselves vulnerable to both psychic and 
historical change' (1997:21). 
Because the rhetorical strategy of enclosure attempts to stabilize the subject's identity 
and works on the principle that a definable, stable subject can be understood and 
therefore controlled, continual mobility on the part of the colonized is an antidote. 
Mobility is a strategy to escape the essentialism used by the colonizer when defining 
subjects, which Bahri (2004:209) mentions, and is similar to Kristeva's subject-in-
process, which some feminists have found useful as an alternative to that of the 
traditionally autonomous, unified, masculine subject (Oliver, 1998:3).21 Bahri writes 
that ' [e]ssentialist stereotypes can be and have been used to demean and 
disenfranchize, to create racial hierarchies, and to exploit' (2004:209). Physical and 
psychic mobility, the cultivation of a subjectivity which is in process and therefore 
difficult to define or pin down, counter the master's project. Therefore, the numerous 
journeys in Atwood, which Mandel (1983:56) mentions and which are first seen as 
metaphors for the development of the subject, can also suggest defiant movement. As 
21 
'A theory of the subject should take into account the full ambivalence of the conditions of its 
operation', writes Butler (1997:15), for example, meaning the subject's relation to power is ambivalent 
because it generates and threatens the subject. 
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Garuba explains, borders do not physically contain the drifting occupants nor do they 
metaphorically enclose the fluidity of these occupants' subjectivities: 'it is one thing to 
draw a map but it is quite another to get people to accept and internalize the map' 
(Garuba, 2002:95). 
Furthermore, the cartographic coherence is threatened with what Rabasa (in Huggan, 
1989: 118) terms 'blind spots': fissures in the map that make it possible to reread and 
distort its focus. Thinking of the map as merely a set of rhetorical strategies which can 
become known to the colonized, it becomes possible to read the map differently. 
Huggan writes that these blind spots expose the map's 'supposedly "universal" mode 
of representation as a set of rhetorical strategies which reinforce the prelocated 
authority of its European makers . . . [they] reveal flaws in the overall presentation of 
the map which allow it to be read in alternative, "non-European" modes' (1989:118). 
Using his master's tools, so to speak, the slave may reconfigure himself because the 
map's believed coherence can be proved a fallacy. 22 
Similar to the colonized's rereading of the map to criticize its colonialist project and 
reconfigure herself, Kristeva's writing the speaking body back into theory (Oliver, in 
Kristeva, 2002:xvii) brings about more possibilities for shifts in power. For Kristeva, 
Oliver writes, 'the body is more than material' (in Kristeva, 2002:xvii). Those who 
have traditionally been cast as body only do have access to language. The suggestion is 
to use the master's language to talk back at him. 
22 In the words of Huggan: 
The "contradictory coherence" implied by the map's systematic 
inscription on a supposedly "uninscribed" earth reveals it, 
moreover, as a palimpsest covering over alternative spatial 
configurations which, once brought to light, indicate both the 
plurality of possible perspectives on, and the inadequacy of any 
single model of, the world. (1989:120) 
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A different kind of linguistic strategy is to try to access the poetic language theorized 
by Kristeva as a kind of signifying practice present in literature which unsettles and 
destroys 'the identity of meaning and speaking subject' ([1975] 2002:93--94). Kristeva 
takes this type of language to be socially transformative, seeing that it gives to 
literature the power to destroy and renew social code (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:101). 
Poetic language conjures up the semiotic and functions outside the master-slave 
discourse. Therefore, the effect of poetic language corresponds to that of the abject, 
which questions borders and threatens identity. Drawing the subject 'toward the 
place where meaning collapses' (Kristeva, [1980] 2002:230), the abject pulls the master 
towards the border. It is here where Atwood's subject wants to stake her claim. 
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Chapter3 
Self and other: the language of maps and borders in 'The circle game' 
Although Atwood's poetic oeuvre technically commences when she self-publishes a 
collection of poems called Double Persephone in 1961, subsequent collections of 
selected work such as Eating Fire: Selected Poetry 1965-1995(1998) take The Circle 
Game to be Atwood's debut collection. First published by the Cranbrook Academy of 
Art in 1964, The Circle Game was in due course published by Canadian publisher 
Anansi in 1966. Its 28 poems include the poem sequence 'The circle game' (pp. 35-44) 
from which the collection takes its name. The cover depicts a simple line of dots 
forming a helix and Atwood explores many of the associative possibilities of circles in 
the collection: the earth circling around the sun to create the seasons,23 the circle of 
life and death24 and the circle games children play.25 Her words become pebbles26 
which she drops into bodies of water such as lakes to form concentric circles. The 
circle game also predicts the vicious circles of power relations and the learned, 
gendered discourses they imply. 27 
'The circle game' sequence is a complex exploration of a relationship between a man 
and a woman. Atwood presents a subject which is structured in terms of an other. In 
Lacanian terms, entry into subjectivity is governed by entry into the symbolic via a 
self-other mode of subject constitution. The relationship between the subject and its 
other is a relationship of power. Furthermore, 'The circle game' demonstrates 
Atwood's use of the language of maps and borders to portray her sense of the subject 
23 For example, see 'Spring in the igloo' (p. 48). 
24 In the poem 'A sibyl' (p. 49), the immortal Sibyl is 'wrinkled as a pickled I baby' (lines 17-18). 
25 See 'The circle game', (pp. 35- 44). 
26 See poem ii of 'Some objects of wood and stone' (p. 61). 
27 The poem 'In my ravines' (pp. 19- 20) alludes to the Oedipus story, with young boys' 'ancient rage' 
(line 34) against 'old men' (line 24) and situated in the 'ravines' of the (woman) speaker's sex. 
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and its interaction with its other. Borders feature prominently in the whole 
collection: in the last stanza of 'Evening trainstation before departure' (p. 15), the 
speaker proclaims: 'I move I and live on the edges I (what edges) I I live I on all the 
edges there are'; while a couple's house in poem i of 'A place: fragments' (p. 73) sits 
'on the rim' (line 1). Water surfaces and the reflective surfaces of mirrors become 
edges or borders signifying the division between the self and the other, but also imply 
a wish to step through a kind of membrane between this world and a different reality 
where the dialectic between self and other might actually be revoked or where the 
language of the symbolic does not demarcate borders so severely. In poem i of 
'Migration: C.P.R.' (p. 52), where 'language is the law' (line 19), for example, the 
couple flees, 'wanting I a place of absolute I unformed beginning' (lines 21-23). 
Lacan's symbolic and Kristeva's subsequent theory on the symbolic and semiotic 
orders resonate here as is the case with the poem 'Pre-amphibian' (p. 63) in which the 
speaker is happy to descend into a watery dream space which 'release[s]' (line 15) her 
from a reality where her lover is 'something [she] can I trace a line around' (lines 17-
18). 
Readings by critics such as Foster ([1977] 1988:153)28 and McCombs (1988:142) show 
that 'The circle game' enacts not only a gendered interpersonal relationship, but 
national power scenarios as well: McCombs (1988:142) calls it a 'Canadian-American 
Sequence' that explores the complex relationship between Canada and America and 
28 Faster writes that 
Atwood confronts her own sexuality and the contemporary roles 
laid down by men for her to play. A minority psychology similar to 
that which informs her identity as a woman informs her national 
identity, for Atwood is a contemporary Canadian aware of be-
longing to a minority culture on the North American continent ... 
([ 1977] 1988: 153) 
Blakely (1983:50) notes Foster's sexism and comments wryly on his reference to women as a 'minority 
psychology'. 
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Ward writes that in the poems Canada exhibits an anxiety over economic and cultural 
domination by the stronger America (1994:97). Thus, the borders depicted separate 
actual geographical spaces as well. This thematic double-take points to a complex 
postcolonial subjectivity in Atwood's work, a subjectivity that 'encode[s] a running 
parallel between the conditioning of Canada as a nation-state and the positioning of 
women within it, and then by extension the positioning of women within any 
governing patriarchy' (Nicholson, 1994:11). Power, therefore, is the common 
denominator in both of these scenarios. The implication here is that, whether or not 
this is a sequence about power relationships between men and women, between 
countries, or between peoples, the author is taking issue with power 'in general' 
(Rigney, 1987:12). My reading of the poem sequence will therefore focus on general 
power relations between a self and an other, or 'two consciousnesses'- as Hegel 
([1807] 1977) would have it- seeing that Atwood's exploration of power relations 
within an interpersonal relationship also comments on relationships in other 
contexts. Atwood's careful avoidance of personal pronouns that would indicate 
gender (one finds the only clear indication that the speaker is a woman in the last 
poem of the sequence when the speaker refers to herself as a 'spineless woman' [line 
29]) is a further indication that Atwood is attempting to explore a generic power 
relation that could be applied to more than one scenario. 
The poem sequence comprises seven parts. A speaker's accounts of children playing 
games alternate with descriptions of her interacting with a lover. With regard to the 
game referred to in the title, the collection also includes a game of chess29 and a card 
game. 30 Similar to the circle game, these games suggest complex power struggles that 
29 See 'An attempted solution for chess problems' (pp. 17- 18). 
30 See 'Playing cards' (pp. 24-25). 
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are gendered and expressed in the terms of empire and the colonization of 
territories. 31 
'The circle game' begins with a description of a game which sounds similar to the 
well-known rhyme 'Ring a Ringo' Roses': 
The children on the lawn 
joined hand to hand 
go round and round 
each arm going into 
the next arm, around 
full circle 
until it comes 
back into each of the single 
bodies again 
They are singing, but 
not to each other: 
their feet move 
almost in time to the singing (p. 35) 
At first, the reader seems to be confronted with something benign: children playing a 
game on the lawn. Though the reader knows not to expect anything benign in the 
dangerous landscapes of this collection established by poems such as 'After the flood, 
we' (p. 12) and 'A decent through the carpet' (pp. 21- 23). In 'The circle game', 
Atwood uses 'Ring a Ringo' Roses' (which refers to thousands of fatalities during the 
Black Plague according to a well-known urban legend)32 to suggest something more 
31 In 'An Attempted solution for chess problems' (pp. 17- 18) the speaker's sister 'ponders her next move 
I the arrangement of her empire' (lines 2- 3), while the 'white king' (line 30) forces 'her universe to his 
I geographies' (lines 35-36). In 'Playing cards' (pp. 24-25), the speaker and her lover 'confront each 
other' (line 44), like the queen who holds 'a golden flower ' (line 20) and the king who holds 'a sceptre 
or a sword' (line 31). The king's weapon is 'something abstract' (line 28), which makes it resemble 
Lacan's concept of the phallus as a metaphor, rather than a penis. 
32 Mikkelson and Mikkelson (1995) dispute this explanation of the origin of the rhyme, however, the 
game still carries these associations. 
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sinister than fun and games. Also, according to the speaker, even though this is a 
game, 'there is no joy in it' (line 22). The onlookers 'can see I the concentration on I 
[the children's] faces, their eyes I fixed on the empty I moving spaces just in I front of 
them' (lines 14-19). The children's eyes are 'fixed' (line 17), but they are staring at 
'empty I moving spaces' (lines 17-18). Atwood's use of the adjective 'empty' to 
describe the spaces stared at by the children indicates a concern with obsolete images. 
The lines 'each arm going into I the next arm' (lines 4-5) suggest the children are 
similar to paper cut-out dolls, which are flat and lack any individuality, seeing that 
each individual doll is an exact copy of another. In the collection, movement to deep 
places often contrasts with flattened-out images, which imply a lack of the deep 
meaning or understanding the speaker usually finds when she moves beyond surfaces. 
Other examples of flat images in The Circle Game include 'This is a photograph of me' 
(p. 11) in which the speaker describes a photograph, a flat image of herself. She urges 
the viewer to look closely because the image makes it difficult to see her clearly. In 
'Playing cards' (pp. 24-25) the 'flowers and the swords' (line 37), indicating the queen 
and king, 'stay flat I are cardboard' (lines 38-39). The flat image of a reflection in a 
mirror also features prominently in the collection and causes Rigney (1987:2) to 
theorize that Atwood's complex mirror imagery implies a way for the self to lose itself 
in 'the vision of the self. Although mirrors often act as 'agents of truth', they also 
mirror obsolete images of women (Rigney, 1987:2). 
Atwood chooses to put the word 'eyes' at the end of line 16, predicting the 
prominence that eyes and the action of looking, as a way to define the other's subject 
position, will have in this poem sequence. This is in keeping with Blakely (1983:39), 
who explains that, because sight 'is governed by the politics of dominance [it] is not 
free for the mutual constitution of the self and other'. According to Lacan, the self 
and the other express their interactions in 'the vertigo of the domination of space' 
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(Lacan, [1977] 2001:31) and Atwood is establishing the subject's gaze and its relation 
to space at the start of the sequence by focusing the reader's attention on the children 
staring fixedly at spaces. This is consistent with the dynamics of Lacan's mirror stage. 
The forming subject needs to imagine its body as separate from its mother. In order 
for the self to locate the other, it would need to know its own borders - the edges 
where it ends and the other begins. 
During the game, all else is ignored whilst the children are in this trance-like state. 
Atwood suggests this daze by her use of short lines, repetitions and enjambment to 
suggest a kind of chant: 
We can see (arm in arm) 
as we watch them go 
round and round 
intent, almost 
studious (the grass 
underfoot ignored, the trees 
circling the lawn 
ignored, the lake ignored) 
that the whole point 
for them 
of going round and round 
is (faster 
slower) 
going round and round (pp. 35-36) 
This stanza establishes the connection between the lovers and the playing children. 
One can almost feel the onlookers' heads turning as they watch the turning children. 
Furthermore, the parenthesis in the stanza's first line '(arm in arm)' is visually 
functional in its enclosing of the words inside it like arms, and might refer to the 
children, whose arms are interlinked (lines 4-5), but can also refer to the lovers who 
may be standing arm in arm. The reader is told that going round and round is not a 
game- it is the 'whole point' (line 31). The implication is that the subsequent 
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interaction between the lovers will also be important and essential. In this stanza, the 
word 'ignored' is repeated three times: the children ignore the tactile sensation of 
grass beneath their feet; the trees that encircle the lawn on the periphery of their 
vision; and the lake (lines 27-30). Atwood uses parentheses to suggest a space 
between brackets, a whole alternative 'world' so to speak, that is ignored. Similar to 
the paper dolls, the circle game is artificial and shallow and lacks the deep meaning 
the collection is concerned with. 
In the collection there is a close connection between a descent into water or through 
a surface, and a descent into the unconscious: poem i of 'Migration: C.P.R.' (p. 53) 
talks of 'inner lakes' (line 27); and in 'Pre-Amphibian' (p. 63), Atwood links a descent 
into water to falling asleep and dreaming (dreams being Freud's 'royal road to the 
unconscious' [Sternberg, 1998:202]). The realm her speaker crosses when submerged 
in water (or at an edge) is a pre-linguistic, semiotic world: a space where language is 
not rigid, solid and something which forces you into a fixed subject position. Ward 
(1994:98) writes about a similar 'crossing of a linguistic border' into a 'pre-linguistic 
state' in Atwood's novel Surfacing (1972). 
The children, however, ignore the lake with its connection to the unconscious or the 
realm of the semiotic. Their learned, artificial, rote quality will be mirrored in the 
failed attempts at real communication between the speaker and her lover. 
In poem ii (pp. 36-37), the speaker addresses her lover. The poem begins with the 
following stanzas: 
Being with you 
here, in this room 
35 
is like groping through a mirror 
whose glass has melted 
to the consistency 
of gelatin 
You refuse to be 
(and I) 
an exact reflection, yet 
will not walk from the glass, 
be separate. (p. 36) 
McCombs ( 1988: 142) places 'The circle game' at Stage I of a trajectory she suggests for 
Atwood's poetic development. According to her, Atwood's Stage I comprises, amongst 
other things, 'the closed world of mirroring'. In poem ii, the two characters in the 
room find themselves face to face in a situation which mirrors that of the playing 
children: the children's spinning around and the speaker's looking through melted 
glass with the 'consistency I of gelatin' (lines S-6) might be said to produce 
comparable sensations- both disorientate and throw you off-balance. Preceded by 
the significant position given to eyes in poem i, poem ii foregrounds the action of 
looking at a reflection. The room is filled with mirrors, 'even I the back of the door I 
has one' (line 17-19). 
The reader imagines that the interaction between the lovers is somehow essential, 
similar to the 'whole point' (line 31) of the children's game in poem i- they are in 
bed (line 29), which makes their interactions intimate and personal. Applying Hegel's 
master-slave dialectic to the poem, one could argue that this essential interaction is 
the formation of the subject in relation to an other. These two characters are 
dependent on the image of the self in the other. According to Lacan's ideas on the role 
of the mirror stage in subject formation, the T cannot be constituted if there is no 
'you' to mirror itself in. Similar to Hegel's dialectic, this mirroring always works both 
ways: the self is reflected in the other, while the other reflects in the self. Poem ii 
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establishes this reciprocal relationship - the lover will not tum away from his 
reflection in the speaker, he 'will not walk from the glass, I be separate' (lines 16-17), 
even though both parties refuse to be an exact copy of the other (lines 7-8). Both 
parties are establishing their identities, unlike the paper doll children. Words and 
phrases such as '[y]ou refuse' (line 7), 'chipped' (line 15), 'crooked' (line 15), 'arguing' 
(line 21), 'sags' (line 30) and 'your face remote' (lines 33-34) all contribute to a feeling 
of dissonance within the relationship. The person whom the speaker faces is ignoring 
her- something which the repetition of the word 'ignored' in poem i prefigured -
whilst listening to people in the other room: 
You look past me, listening 
to them, perhaps, or 
watching 
your own reflection somewhere 
behind my head, 
over my shoulder (p. 37) 
In Hegel's schema, although the two consciousnesses are dependent on each other, 
each one needs to negate or supersede its facing consciousness in order for it to exist 
autonomously. The lover's ignoring of the speaker suggests this sublation: he 'look[s] 
past' (line 23) the speaker. On the level of national power games, McCombs sees the 
lover's ignoring of the speaker in order to listen to the 'people in the next room' as 
enacting Canada's 'colonial mentality', a concept Atwood worked with in her book on 
Canadian literature entitled Survival: A Thematic Guide to Canadian Literature 
(1972). The lover looks to the British, the French or the Americans, the 'people in the 
next room' (line 20) instead of looking at Canada. To McCombs, the speaker's refusal 
to be separate from the lover suggests 'gender entrapment' and also implies the 
entrapment of French Quebec, which is essentially a colony within a colony 
(1988:147), on a national level. 
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Atwood problematizes a simple application of Hegel's dialectic to explain the 
interaction between the speaker and the lover. This mirroring of the two 
consciousnesses is a complex act and their relationship is far from straightforward: 
neither one wants to be an 'exact reflection' (line 9) of the other, but neither one can 
walk away from the other due to the nature of Hegel's dialectic. This process takes 
place in a complicated way, suggested by the bizarre image of a melted mirror. Unlike 
Lacan's mirror, Atwood's is pliable- almost as if one can step through it. In the fourth 
stanza, the speaker mentions that the mirrors in the room are 'chipped' and hang 
'crooked'. These details signify the problematic nature of this self-other mirroring: 
the discourses these mirrors stand for, obscure and distort. Atwood draws the reader's 
attention to the fact that these mirrors reflect an image of the subject. Like the 
photograph in 'This is a photograph of me' (p. 11), this mirror image is flat and devoid 
of a deeper meaning beneath the surface of the glass. The recognition of the self in the 
other in Lacan's mirror is also a misrecognition (Grosz, 1990:39). Lacan uses the term 
'imagd (Lacan, [1977] 2001:2)- which in Latin carries the meaning of 'pretence' as 
well -when he talks about the mirror stage in subject formation. The self you see 
mirrored in the other is not a 'true' self, but an image. Any attempts at getting to a 
deeper understanding of the subject reflected in the mirror would mean a reaching 
beyond the surface of the mirror to a space which is not 'empty' (line 17), but devoid 
of the rigid structures of regular language and fixed subject positions found in the 
symbolic. 
Poem iii (pp. 37-38) describes the adult onlookers walking on the beach and finding 
the children's 'fortifications' in the sand: the adults find 'trenches' 'fortified with 
pointed sticks', 'sand moats' and a 'lake-enclosed island' (lines 27-31). These 
children's situation is similar to the children in the poem 'A sibyl' (pp. 49-51) who 
'play at war' (line 4) and whom the speaker refers to when she thinks that '[t]here are 
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omens of I rockets among the tricycles' (lines 53-55). Poem iii introduces a further 
implication to the self-other dynamic: not only does one consciousness ignore the 
other in order to establish itself, but it also threatens to invade the space of the other. 
Trenches and moats are ways to keep someone from entering a certain territory or 
land. If one were to view the subject's body as land, which Atwood does in poem iv 
where the lover traces the speaker 'like a country's boundary' (line 33), an invasion of 
land would imply an invasion of body and of identity. Atwood's vocabulary of war 
points to this threat of bodily and psychological harm. In Chapter 2 I mentioned that, 
according to Lacan ([1977] 2001:31), fear of bodily harm, rather than fear of death 
(which Hegel had proposed), causes the other to take on a subjugated role. The 
children's apparent indifference when listening to stories of legends of 'monstrous 
battles, and secret I betrayals in the forest I and brutal deaths' (lines 10-12) may 
suggest that they have been told these stories many times. The implication here is that 
their behaviour on the beach is learned behaviour: behavioural patterns that get 
passed on from generation to generation. One could also suggest that the children 
react this way because they are used to similar (or worse) battles, betrayals and 
deaths, thus leaving them uninterested in fairy tales told by grown-ups. Atwood is 
invoking a scene that reminds one of William Golding's Lord of the Flies (1954). 
Similar to 'Ring a Ring o' Roses' in the first stanza, the inclusion of this detail 
undercuts the myth of innocent childhood and implies that no age of innocence or 
period of peace exists prior to this state of being caught up in a relationship of power. 
The battle-ready children reflect the power relation between infant and parent 
always present during the forming of the subject according to psychoanalysis. The 
onslaught by another consciousness and the relentless forming of your own 
subjectivity in relation to an other is therefore inevitable, no matter your age. In 
addition, the ocean's erosion of the children's 'fortifications' seem to suggest that one's 
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attempts to protect oneself against such an attack are inadequate. The structures are 
seen as 
a last attempt 
(however 
eroded by the water 
in an hour) 
to make 
maybe, a refuge human 
and secure from the reach 
of whatever walks along 
(sword hearted) 
these night beaches. (p. 38) 
Although the children ignore the presence of the lake in poem i, another big body of 
water, the ocean, nevertheless makes its presence felt here, implying that the semiotic 
contributes to establishing the subject and to signifying processes and can therefore 
not be ignored. Similar to the other that constitutes the self- an other that 
contributes to the meaning of the subject - the semiotic functions as the other of 
symbolic language. 
The sword-hearted monster that walks the beaches at night is symbolic of phallic 
power- the children are afraid of Lacan's law of the father. One could also suggest 
that the entity's sword heart resembles the children's strongholds 'fortified with 
pointed sticks': here we perhaps have two different metaphors for the hearts of the 
lovers who are the two parties in Hegel's dialectic. They face each other, each ofthem 
ready to enforce his/her consciousness, but the one's heart is protected by mere 
pointed sticks; the other's by swords, symbolizing the imbalance of power and the 
likelihood that the weaker one will be subjected to the position of slave. 
40 
Discussing national power games in 'The circle game', McCombs (1988:149) sees poem 
iii as a re-enactment of a certain 'garrison mentality' which writers such as Northrop 
Frye thought Canadians possessed. She explains this attitude as the colonists' 
cordoning themselves off against the perceived dangers of the new territory.33 
However, the sand 'garrisons' may also refer to the protection of beaches by natives 
against colonial invasion. The carrier of superior technologies (the steel of the swords) 
is outside the stronghold protected only by the wood of the 'pointed sticks', which 
may refer to arrows or spikes. The placement of the entity with superior technology 
outside the garrison suggests that it is the native inhabitants, rather than the 
colonizers, who are doing the defending in this instance. These two contradictory 
readings prove McCombs's point when she writes that different power games are 
interchangeable in Atwood's writing (1988:146). 'The circle game' explores power and 
how it is used by subjects to construct themselves, and by so doing, subjecting an 
other or becoming subjected. Poem iii pre-empts Atwood's use of the language of 
colonialism, the language of borders and maps, to explore this power relation in 
interpersonal relationships between characters such as the lovers in this poem 
sequence. 34 
Poem iv (pp. 39-40) further establishes Atwood's vocabulary of mirrors, maps and 
borders and its relation to the subject. 35 Having been ignored in poem ii, and with the 
threat of invasion36 and bodily harm implied by poem iii, the speaker now exposes the 
lover's power game: 
33 Atwood explores this fear in detail in 'Further arrivals' (p. 13) in her second collection, The Journals 
of Susanna Moodie (1970). 
34 Atwood's collection Power Politics (1971) is an extended example of her use of the language of 
colonialism to describe a love relationship. 
35 McCombs writes that '[a]t "Circle's" centre, section iv, is the couple's climactic map game, in which 
imperial and horror scenarios underlie the gender domination' (1988:149). 
36 In poem ii of the sequence 'Letters, towards and away' in the same collection (pp. 69- 72), the speaker 
also feels invaded: 'How could you invade I me when I I ordered you not I to ' (lines 3-6). 
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Returning to the room: 
I notice how 
all your word-
plays, calculated ploys 
of the body, the witticisms 
of touch, are now 
attempts to keep me 
at a certain distance 
and (at length) avoid 
admitting I am here (p. 39) 
The lover employs his language ('word- I plays'), as well as his physicality ('ploys I of 
the body' and 'witticisms I of touch') to manipulate the relationship he has with the 
speaker. Words, as tools used in relations of power are necessary to acquire 
subjectivity in the symbolic, and are given a position of prominence when Atwood 
breaks the word 'word-play' over two lines to end the line with 'word-'. One could 
suggest that the lover's strategies are all attempts to frame the speaker in space: the 
lover tries to keep the speaker 'at a certain distance' in an action which reminds one 
of the treatment oflepers (or political prisoners on Robben Island)- space had been 
manipulated to contain the other physically and therefore had made it easier to ignore 
her. The lover's refusing to recognize the presence of the speaker is similar to the 
colonizer's refusal to acknowledge the existence of native inhabitants on the maps of 
colonized territories. 
However, stanza 2 suggests that the lover's attempt at ignoring the speaker is 
unsuccessful- he now regards her, but 'indifferently': 
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I watch you 
watching my face 
indifferently 
yet with the same taut curiosity 
with which you might regard 
a suddenly discovered part 
of your own body: 
a wart perhaps (p. 39) 
The lover's 'discovery' of the speaker is likened to the discovery of a wart- an ugly, 
parasitic and bothersome growth on his skin. Unable to keep the speaker 'at a 
distance', the lover now has to deal with an annoying other who is making her 
presence felt on his body. The invasion foretold by poem iii now moves in the other 
direction- the other is invading the body of the subject. Atwood's use of the word 
'indifferently' resembles a phrase in Hegel: he explains that the two facing 
consciousnesses 'leave each other free only indifferendy' (my emphasis), when they 
'do not reciprocally give and receive one another back from each other consciously' 
([1807] 1977:114),37 which happens when the power relation between the two 
consciousnesses is skewed/unbalanced. The lover's indifference suggests that he 
regards himself as superior in this relationship: Hegel's master sees the 'bondsman' as 
inferior (similar to a 'wart') and therefore not an adequate consciousness for his own 
to be mirrored in. In the next line, however, the lover is not indifferent anymore, but 
curious and nervous. It is a 'taut curiosity', as if he goes rigid with uncertainty at the 
idea, which might be said to be similar to the subject's experience of the Kristevan 
abject: having recognized the other, the lover now stands near the border between 
self and other. Here, his 'meaning collapses' (Kristeva, [1980] 2002:230): he is being 
pulled towards a place where his existence ceases and the other's existence begins. 
Similar to the infant's experience of abjection, the lover is intrigued (he regards her 
37 Baillie's translation reads: 'the two do not mutually give and receive one another back from each 
other through consciousness; they let one another go quite indifferently' (Hegel, [1807] 1949:234). 
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with 'taut curiosity'), but also unsure or anxious, suggested by the prominent placing 
of the word 'perhaps' at the end of the stanza in line 18. 
Being part of the lover's body implies an intimacy between the two parties, which 
Atwood immediately undercuts: although the speaker is part of the lover, the lover 
regards this other as a non-essential piece of himself: something that should not be 
there and, by being present, blemishes him. This infection ties in with the motif of 
(bodily) invasion. The lover's reaction suggests that he is re-enacting sexist paradigms 
in which women are associated with the body, with being unclean or decaying 
(Oliver, 1998:1). In Hegel's system, the casting of the other as non-essential is a 
strategy used by the subject to establish his/her own autonomy. However, seeing that 
the self is constructed from what it sees in the other, this casting of the other as non-
essential implies that the self casts itself as non-essential as well, 'for this other is 
itself writes Hegel ([1807] 1977:111). Benjamin (1988:53) explains the process as 
follows: 'If I destroy the other, there is no one to recognize me, for if I allow him no 
independent consciousness, I become enmeshed with a dead, not-conscious being'. 
Atwood links stanza 2 to the third stanza by starting with the lower case 'and', 
suggesting that the lover's reaction to his noticing the other resembles his engagement 
with maps during childhood. Atwood's use of cartographic metaphors to explore 
power relations and subjectivity is most obvious in stanza 3 onwards: 
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and I remember 
you said 
in childhood you were 
a tracer of maps 
(not making but) moving 
a pen or a forefinger 
over the courses of the rivers, 
the different colours 
that mark the rise of mountains; 
a memorizer 
of names (to hold 
these places 
in their proper places) (p. 39) 
Similar to the lover's manipulation of the other's space in stanza 2, where he keeps 
the speaker 'at a certain distance', the lover now employs language ('names' and the 
fixed subject positions they imply) 'to hold I these places I in their proper places' 
(lines 29-31). The use of the word 'proper' is ironic, seeing that it is the lover or 
master who decides where these 'proper' places should be. He also decides what the 
names in his language should be. However, the parenthesis in line 5 of stanza 3, '(not 
making but) ' makes it clear that the lover only 'traces' maps. This is an important 
detail and Atwood uses the brackets to focus the reader's attention on it. McCombs 
explains that, on a national power level, this could mean that the lover is Canadian: 
he is 'a staring, passive, frigid imitator of his imperial models' (1988: 150). Conversely, 
Atwood is also showing that the lover is merely enacting an existing gender discourse 
- he is not creating the map, merely tracing it. This would acknowledge that the 
man's gender role had been assigned to him by society. Similar to the learned 
behaviour the children exhibit in their circle game, Atwood exposes the lover's 
learned, gendered behaviour. A third possibility for this emphasis on the man's 
tracing, rather than creating, the map might be because Atwood is refusing to cast the 
man as creator. Although he has access to symbolic language (the 'word- I plays' in 
lines 3-4), Atwood is emphasizing that he is not the only one. He is not the creator of 
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language, having stepped into an already established symbolic system as a boy. The 
possibility is left open for the speaker (she is, after all the speaker) to 'trace' maps also. 
The rhetorical strategies of the map become known to the colonized and therefore 
can be used against the colonizer (Huggan, 1989:118). Like Kristeva, Atwood is 
promoting the role of women as speaking subjects. Breaking up the lover's word-plays 
(lines 3-4) over two lines shows graphically how the woman speaker is able to snap in 
half the subjugating discourse of her lover by using his language against him. 
In stanza 4, the speaker shows how her body is treated as land, exemplifying Gamba's 
explication that, within colonialist (and patriarchal) discourses, the other's body (as 
representative of the whole individual- body, mind and emotions) is figured as land 
and the subject's land as body (2002:105): 
So now you trace me 
like a country's boundary 
or a strange new wrinkle in 
your own wellknown skin 
and I am fixed, stuck 
down on the outspread map 
of this room, of your mind's continent 
(here and yet not here, like 
the wardrobe and the mirrors 
the voices through the wall 
your body ignored on the bed), 
transfixed 
by your eyes' 
cold blue thumbtacks (pp. 39-40) 
The speaker is 'traced' and her subject position is 'fixed'. Similar to the wart in stanza 
2, she now resembles a wrinkle on the lover's skin. The woman is once again 
associated with the body and with decay. The possessive pronoun 'your' in the last 
line of stanza 4, 'your body ignored on the bed', reduces the speaker to body only -
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she belongs to the lover as his 'bondsman' or slave. Furthermore, she is not a 
consciousness- only a body. However, the wrinkle resembles a border, indicating 
perhaps the lover's circling nearer and nearer to where he will experience abjection 
fully. Like the wart which 'invaded' the body of the lover in line 18 of poem iv, the 
speaker is re-inscribed onto the body of the lover, this time in the form of a wrinkle. 
Once again the reciprocity between the self and other in Hegel's dialectic is 
established. Moreover, Benjamin (1988:55) writes that the violation of the boundaries 
of the other's body becomes a way of representing the struggle to the death for 
recognition of two consciousnesses in Hegel's schema. Thus, the lover's perception of 
the speaker's invasion of his body I her crossing the borders of his body may suggest 
that the indifference, with which he regarded her in line 13 of poem iv, was feigned. 
The closing tercet of poem iv circles back to poem i, where the children's eyes were 
described as being 'fixed on the empty I moving spaces just in I front of them' (p. 35). 
Fixed by the lover's gaze, the speaker is nothing but an empty, static, pinned-down 
space open for his advances. The way in which the first poem predicts the treatment 
of the other in poem iv shows that, structurally, Atwood is using the children poems 
(poems i, iii, v, and vii) to prefigure the dynamic between the two adults in the other 
poems. 
In poem v (pp. 40--41), the circling is back to the children's sandcastle fortifications 
(witnessed in poem iii) when the speaker describes a visit to a fort-turned-museum. 
The reader is told that the children 'like the guns I and the armour' (lines 5-6) 
'especially' (line 4) and that these weapons were 'brought from I other times and 
countries' (lines 6-7). Like the children's structures, the fort is also 'crumbling' (line 
19), but this time not because of the water, but because of 'the unceasing attacks of 
feet and flower roots' (lines 21). The 'archaic' maces and 'broken spears' (lines 11-12), 
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which the children draw after their visit to the museum, contribute to the view of the 
colonized's technologies not being able to withstand the superior force of the 
colonizer's cannons (line 15). Atwood relates the battles that had taken place years 
ago to battles of a different kind: '[t]he weapons I that were once outside I sharpening 
themselves on war I are now indoors' (lines 22-25). Being indoors once again suggests 
that a similar struggle as was the case between the colonized and the colonizer will be 
re-enacted by the lovers, who find themselves indoors in a room. Likened to tools 
used to establish relations of power in poem iv, words resemble these weapons and, 
like the weapons, Atwood implies that language is not 'worth defending' (line 37). 
This is in keeping with a general sense in the collection that everyday, symbolic 
language is incapable of describing the speaker's reality accurately. 'Against still life' 
(p. 65) provides another example. In this poem, the speaker wants 'more to be said to 
[her] I than just Orange: I [she] want[ s] to be told I everything it has to say' (lines 13-
16). The parenthesis '(much)' in 'elaborate defences keep I things that are no longer I 
(much) I worth defending' ('The circle game', poem v, lines 34-37) implies however 
that even though symbolic language has been shown to be suspect, it remains the only 
form for expressing such a suspicion. 
Poem vi (pp. 41-42) continues to reinforce the reciprocal nature of the relationship 
between self and other. The lover still negates his dependence on the speaker. Instead, 
he plays an 'orphan game' (line 2) in which he resembles an urchin standing flat-
nosed against a window pane looking at a family having a meal. The game is a 'ragged 
winter game I that says, I am alone' (lines 3-4). According to the speaker, the lover 
wants her to play this game also. The speaker reminds the lover that he despises the 
'Victorian Christmas-card' quality (line 15) of the family: amongst other things, the 
'father and mother I playing father and mother' (lines 23-24). Socialized gender 
positions suggested by the lover's tracing the map in poem iv are ironically despised 
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by the lover in poem vi. He prefers to be left alone. After noticing the other as a wart 
or a wrinkle on his skin, he also wants to be situated outside of Hegel's dialectic: 
He's glad 
to be left 
out by himself 
in the cold 
(hugging himself). 
When I tell you this, 
you say (with a smile fake 
as a tinsel icicle): 
You do it too. (p. 42) 
The lover is 'glad' (line 25) to be left out 'in the cold' (line 28). The game he plays on 
his own is a 'safe game' (line 1). Benjamin explains why separating from the slave may 
be considered safe. Having been dehumanised/objectified by the master, the 
subjected's 'unreality becomes too powerful'; the master 'is in danger of becoming the 
will-less thing he consumes unless he separates himself completely' (1988:65). 
Furthermore, the lover's wanting to separate suggests the degree to which the speaker 
has been subjected- she may be nearing the stage of a 'will-less thing'. While the 
family's 'Victorian Christmas-card' quality (line 15) he so despises implies that stifling 
Victorian perceptions of women are still rife in the poem (the 'cage of bones' in line 
30 of poem vii being an apt description for the corset), the Christmas card also 
corresponds to a depthless quality that he has been attributing to the woman 
throughout the poem. He is the one who thinks her subject position can be transfixed 
with his eyes' 'cold blue thumbtacks' in line 45 of poem iv and who treats her body as 
a map that can be traced (poem iv, lines 32-34). However, the reciprocal implications 
of the Hegelian dialectic are highlighted when one considers that the lover might be 
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looking at his own reflection in the window pane when he stands 'pinched nose 
pressed I against the glass' (lines 9-1 0). 
The speaker admits that she might also be playing the same games. When the lover 
tells her 'You do it too' (line 33), she responds: 'Which in some ways I is a lie, but also 
I suppose I is right, as usual' (lines 34--36). She admits a certain complicity in this 
power game, a motif always present in Atwood.38 However, there is a difference: she 
tends 'to pose I in other seasons I outside other windows' (lines 37-39). If one takes 
the window to be a kind of mirror and the mirror as a metaphor for the subject 
constructing itself in relation to an other, other windows imply that different subject 
positions may be available. Whereas the lover refuses to acknowledge the existence of 
the other, or regards the other as non-essential, Atwood seems to suggest that the 
speaker opens herself up to be mirrored in additional others. She is taking on different 
subject positions and therefore rejects her being reduced to body (poem iv, line 42), a 
reduction which does not allow her to function as a 'speaking social being' (Oliver, in 
Kristeva, 2002:297). 
In poem vii (pp. 42-44) the children are now inside: 
This casual bed 
scruffy as dry turf, 
the counterpane 
rumpled with small burrows, is 
their grassy lawn (p. 43) 
Atwood consolidates the different spaces of the sequence - the bed becomes the 
'grassy lawn' (line 9); the beach in poem iii is now 'the nearby beach' (line 16). Like 
she did with the menacing 'Ring a Ring o' Roses', Atwood writes a wasp into the 
38 See Rigney (1987:3) on the subjected's complicity in Atwood. 
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poem to maintain that sense of danger she had been adding to something that initially 
seemed like an innocent children's game: 
(a wasp comes, 
drawn by the piece of sandwich 
left on the nearby beach 
(how carefully you do 
such details); 
one of the children flinches 
but won't let go) (p. 43) 
Her parenthesis within parenthesis (lines 17-18 in stanza 4) adds an interesting 
dimension to the poem sequence: one might suggest that the strange phrasing of 
'(how carefully you do I such details)' can be taken to be a comment to the author. 
The lover has been classified as a mere tracer of maps in poem iv, making his insertion 
of a carefully selected detail (the wasp) into this scene doubtful, seeing that he does 
not seem to be a creator. Furthermore, the 'you' is accused of making the children 
'turn and tum, according to I the closed rules of your games, I but there is no joy in it' 
(lines 22-24). It is logical to assume that it was the author, rather than the lover, who 
made the children turn in the first place. This possible piece of self-reflexive writing 
could point to writers' complicity in framing the other in a certain way. Who, other 
than Atwood, was responsible for subjecting the speaker in this poem sequence? 
Stanza 8 implies that the lover might not be the only source of danger and the last 
tercet of poem vi, 'although I tend to pose I in other seasons I outside other windows' 
(lines 37-39) suggests the possibility of multiple masters to subject to. It is therefore 
understandable that the speaker questions the source of danger in lines 37-39: 
(of course there is always 
danger but where 
would you locate it) (p. 43) 
Even so, in poem vii, it is the lover's gaze that turns the speaker to 'a spineless woman 
in I a cage of bones' (lines 29- 30). His gaze traps her in her own body and she 
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becomes an 'obsolete fort' (line 30), emphasizing that when she had talked about 
fortresses in the preceding poems she had been saying something about her own 
position. 
The 'glass cage' the children 'spin' with their 'thread-thin I insect voices' (lines 40--44) 
circles back to the weapons exhibited in glass cases in the museum in poem v. The 
suggestion here is that symbolic language, which can 'stick down' people into fixed 
subject positions as in poem iv, also protects the archaic weapons of subjection- the 
word-plays of poem iv, lines 3--4. The poem sequence ends dramatically when the 
speaker declares her desire to free herself from the circle game: 
I want to break 
these bones, your prisoning rhythms 
(winter, 
summer) 
all the glass cases, 
erase all maps, 
crack the protecting 
eggshell of your turning 
singing children: 
I want the circle 
broken. (p. 44) 
The speaker wants to 'erase' the maps or existing discourses and wants to break the 
vicious cycle of gender roles being instilled during childhood. Alarmingly, the poem 
suggests that, for the subjected, a possible way to break this circle of subjection is to 
turn against their own bodies. A way to escape the 'cage of bones' (line 30), is to break 
'these bones' (line 51 ). Thus, 'The circle game' hints at embracing death, Hegel's 
'sovereign master' ([1807] 1949:237), as a way of breaking this circle of perpetual 
power imbalances. 
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In later collections, Atwood will continue to explore ways of navigating the power 
politics involved in the self-other dialectic and the framing of the subject in terms of 
an other. She also persists in expressing a deep mistrust in symbolic language. Ward 
writes that, to Atwood, language 'becomes an instrument of control, of confinement, 
of deformation, and yet, paradoxically neither limitation nor liberation can be 
expressed except in language' (1994:99). In a way, this is the circle game the poet finds 
herself in. However, numerous references to bridges in The Circle Game suggest a 
wish to cross over to a reality devoid of the restrictions of symbolic language. In 'After 
the flood, we' (p. 12), the speaker 'walk[s] across the bridge I towards the safety of 
high ground' (lines 5-6) and in the poem 'In my ravines' (pp. 19-20), old men and 
young boys sleep 'under the bridges I of the city in [the speaker's] (still) I ravines' 
(lines 21-23). In this realm, similar to Kristeva's semiotic, words 'are as pointless I as 
calling in a vacant I wilderness' ('Journey to the interior' [pp. 57-58], lines 38-40). It 
is a dangerous wish: submerging yourself into this space anterior to ordinary language 
brings with it the realization that 'many have been here, but only I some have 
returned safely' ('Journey to the interior', lines 32-33). Being on the bridge also 
implies facing the abject. The next chapter will further explore the subjected's use of 
language tools, symbolic and poetic, to reconfigure his position in the power game. 
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Chapter4 
Crossing the border: the subjected's way out in 'Two-headed poems' 
In Chapter 3, I read 'The circle game' as an example of a work where Atwood presents 
a subject that is constructed by means of a power relationship with an other. This 
chapter will consider possible ways of rising above the borders of subjection and the 
constricting fixed subject positions explored by Atwood by referring to her seventh 
collection, Two-Headed Poems (1978), a collection that is thematically comparable to 
The Circle Game. 
Rigney (1987:3) shows that Atwood's characters are usually complicit in their own 
oppression. Cooley (1994), however, argues that Atwood's speakers are far from 
powerless as my reading of 'The circle game' in Chapter 3 suggests. Because of their 
access to symbolic language, which gives them 'verbal power' (Cooley, 1994:68), 
othered characters construct themselves and their (male) partners in a narrative space. 
They 'supervis[e] their own narratives' (Cooley, 1994:69). Because oflanguage access, 
the distinction between Hegel's master and bondsman becomes blurred in Atwood's 
work. However, the threat of subjugation remains present. For this reason, one may 
expect to find tactics for overthrowing unequal power systems. Atwood sometimes 
expresses these strategies of escape in terms of maps and borders. Themes of 
continuous transformation39 suggest physical and psychic mobility- strategies that 
problematize fixed subject positions. In poem 6 of the sequence 'Daybooks I' (pp. 27-
33) in Two-Headed Poems, an 'old queen' (line 1) first needs to be transformed, by 
having her head chopped off, before she is given voice: 'After this transformation I 
she can sing' (lines 6-7). Part I ofthis chapter therefore briefly mentions that Atwood 
39 Nicholson (1994:24) writes that Atwood's worlds always suggest change. He writes of Atwood's 
'mapping of the self in a world of words which will always privilege transformation'. 
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uses cartographic rhetorical strategies to navigate power relations. These strategies 
include writing the speaking body back into poetry in ways which correspond to 
Kristeva's writing the body back into psychoanalytic theory (Oliver, in Kristeva, 
2002:xvii). Here the subjected fights with the master's weapons. However, as Part II 
of this chapter shows, Atwood mainly explores strategies that draw on what 
Nicholson terms 'alternative systems of signification' (1994:22) in Two-Headed 
Poems. Moreover, Atwood shows an interest in a kind of language that resembles 
Kristeva' s poetic language and describes processes similar to the dialectic between her 
semiotic and symbolic orders. Here, the hope is to transcend the Hegelian dialectic. 
I Strategies of escape: keep on moving 
As was shown in Chapter 2, seeing that the rhetorical strategy of enclosure attempts 
to stabilize the subject's identity and works on the principle that a definable, stable 
subject can be understood and therefore controlled, continual mobility on the part of 
the subjected can be seen as a strategy of escape. In poem 5 of the sequence 'Daybooks 
I', the speaker proclaims 'I know I I where I live and it is not I in this box' (lines 12-
14). These lines allude to Atwood's fascination with the Sibyl,40 but they also describe 
a subjectivity similar to Kristeva's subject-in-process and provide an alternative model 
to that of the traditionally autonomous masculine subject (Oliver, 1998:3). The 
cultivation of a subjectivity that is in process, and therefore difficult to define or pin 
down, keeps the subject psychologically mobile and counters the master's project. 
The numerous journeys in Atwood mentioned by Mandel (1983:56), that can be seen 
as metaphors for the development of the subject, might therefore also suggest 
purposeful psychological movements similar to the processes suggested by Kristeva' s 
40 Examples include 'A Sibyl' (in The Circle Game, p. 49), 'The Elysium Lifestyle Mansions' (in Ovid 
Metamorphosed, pp. 206--213), 'Bottle' (in The Tent, pp. 9-12) and 'Bottle II ' (in The Tent, pp. 37- 40). 
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subject-in-process. Borders do not physically contain occupants nor do they 
metaphorically enclose the fluidity of these occupants' subjectivities (Garuba, 
2002:95). In the poem 'The woman makes peace with her faulty heart' (pp. 85-86), 
the speaker's heart is a vulture, a 'sly featherless bird' that 'would not be captured' 
(lines 15-16). She had been violently 'shoved' by her heart 'this far' (line 40). The 
cage of bones in 'The circle game' is found in this poem as well: 
How many times have I told you: 
The civilized world is a zoo, 
not a jungle, stay in your cage. 
And then the shouts 
of blood, the rage as you threw yourself 
against my ribs. (p. 85) 
Attempting to break out of this cage is painful and violent. It is also the woman who 
inhibits her heart from breaking out: she tells it to stay in its cage (line 24). As always 
with Atwood, this fight against rigid subject positions has a flip side because the 
positions, like borders, supply meanings. If they were to betray each other, both the 
woman and the heart will perish: 'it's me for the urn, you for the jar' (line 47). 
II A different language, a different subject 
With the above cartographic strategies in Two-Headed Poems, Atwood is also 
interested in strategies that involve a language that Kristeva would call 'poetic'. In the 
title sequence as well as the poem 'The right hand fights the left' (pp. 57-58), Atwood 
conceives of a language that mirrors Kristeva' s poetic language - a language that 
challenges notions of fixed subject positions and proposes a subject similar to 
Kristeva's subject-in-process. Furthermore, processes in 'The right hand fights the left' 
resemble the dialectic between the semiotic and symbolic orders, an interaction that 
brings forth signification and constitutes the subject (Kristeva, 1984:23-24). 
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'The right hand fights the left' describes a battle between a person's two hands. The 
left hand is 'soft and smaller' (line 18) than the right hand and my subsequent reading 
will associate this hand with the semiotic, while the right hand is stronger and made 
of metal (line 7) and will be taken to resemble the symbolic. In the first four stanzas, 
both hands enact language or signifying practices: the left hand sings (line 3); it has a 
voice that calls at sunset (lines 21-22); the right hand answers (line 4); kills and 
arranges nouns (line 8); makes lists (line 13); and moans in its sleep (line 37). The 
reader is told that the war between the hands has not been there from the start. The 
first two lines of the poem asks: 'Why should there be war? I Once there was none'. 
This information corresponds to a pre-symbolic state, a state before language, which 
Kristeva proposes prior to Oedipalization, in which the semiotic left hand set the 
pace. Stanza 2 reads: 'The left hand sang the rituals, I the right hand answered', 
suggesting the left hand led. It is significant that it is the feminine hand that used to 
set the pace because this detail corresponds to the focus being on the body of the 
mother before the child's leap towards the symbolic. 
In the third stanza, the first word '[n]ow' indicates that a change in this relationship 
had taken place: 
Now, the right hand dips down 
into the chemicals of its own blood 
and comes up metal. (p. 57) 
The right hand's dipping down 'into the chemicals of its own blood' (line 6) suggests 
that this separation between the right and the left is intimately connected to the body 
and even present in the 'blood' of a pre-symbolic state. In contrast with Freud and 
Lacan, Kristeva argues that separation begins prior to the mirror or Oedipal stage and 
that parental threats, but also parental love help the infant enter the symbolic (Oliver, 
in Kristeva, 2002:xx:i-xxii). A split between the symbolic and the semiotic would be 
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present in the 'blood' of the pre-symbolic state, however, the blood imagery would be 
nearer to the violent Oedipalization or entrance into the symbolic. 
Stanza 4 develops the speaker's conception of the right hand. The stanza reads: 
It arranges the nouns it has killed 
in plaza windows, 
it is odorless and dry, 
it squeezes and apple plasma 
drips from its fist. 
It oils itself and makes lists 
of its enemies, it swivels 
on the wrist like a spy, a radar, 
a tentacled silver eye. (p. 57) 
The right hand has killed 'nouns' and now arranges these in the shop windows of 
plazas. Nouns name things and these window displays suggest that the right hand 
presents its victims of war as a kind of trophy or possibly a deterrent to those still 
alive. It is possible that Atwood uses 'plaza windows' to focus attention on the plaza -
the place where executions usually took place. Nouns are also usually thought of as 
'things' or objects. This detail points to the objectification that the right hand is 
responsible for, similar to the objectification of the other in the self-other dialectic. 
This hand is a violent, aggressive warrior. Its lack of odour and moisture signals its 
remove from the body- it is a 'metal' hand (line 7) - an image suggesting an iron fist. 
One associates this ruler with the law of the father. The right hand's killing of 'nouns' 
could suggest the symbolic order superimposing itself on the semiotic in order to 
enforce the law of the father. The right hand is patriarchal. It crushes an apple, 
signifying perhaps the obliteration of the organic, fruitful semiotic order. Atwood 
may also be alluding to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden where they had been 
'one with God' before being banished from the garden for eating fruit from the Tree 
of Knowledge. The right hand possesses the piercing eye of the father, the male gaze 
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of a phallic 'tentacled silver eye' (line 16). The act of seeing and power is reflected 
here in Atwood's use of a periscope-like 'silver eye' (line 16) to describe the stronger 
right hand that would pin down the left hand like the lover's gaze did to the speaker 
in poem iv of 'The circle game'. The father's gaze pins down the child in a gendered 
subject position. Also, the swivelling eye is a powerful image for the law of the father 
'seeing to it' that the mother's body is renounced when the child enters the symbolic 
order. 
However, the position in which Atwood casts the left hand is not that of a defenceless 
victim. The sixth and seventh stanza read: 
It sleeps during the day 
when the right hand is marching, 
but that voice you heard at sunset 
was the left hand calling: 
Arise, 0 fingers 
of the left hand, and outside, in a tangle 
of liquid roots and the quick sprawl 
of tendrils over the earth, 
the forces of the left hand wake 
to savage life. (pp. 57-58) 
The left hand sleeps during the day, only to awake at dusk, an image which suggests 
an affinity with the darker forces of night and with the unconscious. The left hand 
has a voice and an army: its 'forces' 'wake I to savage life' (lines 27-28) when night 
falls . Unlike the 'dry' (line 10) right hand, these forces of the left wake 'in a tangle I of 
liquid roots' (lines 24-25), all images that tally with the womb-like chora. In contrast 
with the law of the father governing the right hand, the savagery of the left hand is 
similar to the chora not trying to create definite meanings or to signify (Kristeva, 
[1975] 2002:101), Stanza 10 gives a sense of the charas regenerative, but also 
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annihilatory, regulation process (Kristeva, 1984:26): 'there is no winner, only joy I and 
no joy' (lines 41-42). 
Although the hands are at war, there exist similarities between them: the 'tendrils' 
(line 26) of the left echo the tentacles of the right (line 16). Similar to the reciprocity 
established between the self and its other in Hegel's dialectic, there exists a 
reciprocity between the two different orders of Kristeva's model: the signifying 
process is indebted to both (Kristeva, 1984:24). This indebtedness is suggested in the 
last two lines of the poem: when the left hand's ritual requires slaughter, it is the right 
hand that carries the knife: 'The right hand holds the knife, I the left hand dances' 
(lines 45-46). Stanza 8 holds a further image of reciprocity: an owl hunts a mouse and 
in the process the mouse's blood becomes integrated with the owl's- the pray 
becomes part of the predator: 
An owl strikes, and mouseblood becomes owl 
blood, each fur stomach 
extrudes a mouth, snails 
rasp against leaves, in the hearts 
of purple flowers moth-
eggs multiply, the feral darkness 
flickers with cactus teeth. (p. 58) 
The forces of the left hand, here represented by the nocturnal owl, with the 
multiplying moth-eggs as an image of fruitfulness, signify continuous regeneration 
that corresponds with that of the semiotic chora (Kristeva, 1984:16). The owl will 
eventually vomit out the pellet of hair and bone that grew 'mouths' in its stomach. 
The stomach is near the womb, which is a metaphor for the chora, the place in which 
the semiotic metaphorically sits (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:101). This vomiting is a strong 
image of the semiotic being given a voice- it has a mouth and 'cactus teeth' (line 35). 
The semiotic therefore spills over or erupts into the symbolic, threatening its 
signifying structures. It also signals the presence of the abject. This return to the pre-
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symbolic, and by implication, to the body of the mother (which turned into the abject 
in order to force the infant to enter the symbolic) means facing the abject. The 
revulsion caused by coming into contact with the abject is typically expressed through 
vomiting (Semetsky, 2005:3). 
In stanza 9, the right hand sleeps while the left hand gathers its forces. Still, it seems 
to be troubled unconsciously by the movements of the left: 'The right hand turns I in 
its sleep, moans I like a train, like a wrong turn, like a chain' (lines 36-38). The 
suggestion here is that the ghost of times past, when there was no war between the 
right and the left hand, is shaking its chains, reminding the right hand of the 'wrong 
turn' (line 38) it took when it 'chained' the left hand into slavery. 
In stanza 11, day breaks, the left hand and its forces recede. The semiotic, which had 
overflowed the symbolic, is repressed: 'Dawn comes, and the right hand blasts I 
another tree from its burrow' (lines 43-44). The Tree of Knowledge is destroyed, and 
with it the knowledge of the power of the semiotic. 
The poem sequence 'Two-headed poems' (pp. 59-74) further develops this idea of two 
modes whose dialectic is similar to the dialectic between the semiotic and symbolic. 
In these poems, Atwood describes a conversation between Siamese twins. The subject 
matter of the poem sequence is a literal extension of the self and its other found in 
'The circle game'. The sequence comprises 11 poems. Even in the number of poems in 
the sequence one finds a twin: 1 and 1. Atwood opens with a 1954 advertisement for 
Siamese twins on display. Unlike identical twins, Siamese twins share the same body; 
often the same essential organs. The epigraph reads: 'Joined Head to Head, and still 
alive'. The dependence ofthe one twin on the other is therefore rooted much more 
closely to the realm of the body than the speaker and her lover in 'The circle game' 
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who were physically separate albeit emotionally intertwined. Atwood's choosing of 
Siamese twins rather than identical twins adds an element of the grotesque to the 
sequence and comments on the vulgarity of the power relationship between these 
two entities. The tension in the twins' shared body, as well as within the body of the 
poem sequence, suggests an imbalance in the distribution of power as well as a split 
subject. Atwood is interested in this split and the power play between the two sides 
such a split implies: in an afterword to The journals of Susanna Moodie (1970) she 
writes that her reason for writing about Mrs Moodie is that she 'is divided down the 
middle'; Canada is also split: 'This country is something that must be chosen ... and if 
we do choose it we are still choosing a violent duality' (p. 62). 
As is the case with 'The circle game', 'Two-headed poems' is an example of the 
playing out of power scenarios on different levels. The repetition of the word 
'sometimes' in the opening tercet indicates that the poems will approach the twins' 
relationship from multiple angles. In the last stanza of poem iii, in which the different 
members of a family 'quarrel' (line 19) among themselves and discuss 'genealogies and 
the mortgage' (line 21) provides another example. Quarrelling about genealogies 
indicates that this is not a family, seeing that families generally know their family 
tree, but a group of people or a country. It is clear that the poems comment on 
relationships in different contexts: inter- as well as intrapersonal; those between 
nation-states; and those between the colonizer and the colonized. Similar to the 
lovers in 'The circle game', and to all other power relationships, the twins are trapped 
in a Hegelian relationship of master and bondsman that mirrors the relationship 
between the semiotic and symbolic orders as well as political relationships between 
territories: the self-other dialectic is present in its broadest sense, which leads 
McCombs (1988) to read the poem sequence as a commentary on the Canadian-
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English versus Canadian-French language wars.41 She therefore extends the power 
scenario in the poems to include political relationships between groups. 
Interestingly, although Atwood chooses twins as subject matter for the poems, the 
title reads 'two-headed poems', not 'two-headed twins'. The title therefore implies 
that the disparate voices of the twins echo processes taking place in poetry. According 
to the tercet, the heads are speaking in a poem. Atwood's use of the indefinite article 
signals perhaps that she finds these two voices in her other poems as well, or maybe 
even in all poems. Similar to the two hands in 'The right hand fights the left' (pp. 57-
58), the two twins in 'Two-headed poems' correspond to Kristeva's two sides of 
signification: the semiotic and the symbolic. In both instances both sides are needed 
to signify adequately and bring about subjectivity. 
The tercet further prepares the reader for a complex speaker or speakers speaking in 
two voices: 'The heads speak sometimes singly, sometimes I together, sometimes 
alternately within a poem'. The voices are locked in an uncomfortable relationship, 
and '[l]ike all Siamese twins, they dream of separation'. But separation will bring 
about death, seeing that the twins are joined '[h]ead to [h]ead'. 
As was the case in 'The right hand fights the left', poem i of 'Two-headed poems' 
refers to a time prior to the strife between the 'we' and the 'you'. Poem i begins: 
41 McCombs identifies various references to these wars in the sequence and notes, for example: 
attempts to enforce bilingualism made by the federal Commissioner of Official Languages; attempts to 
purify Canada's French made by the French; attempts to purge English from Quebec made by the Parti 
quebeqois; and attempts to rid the skies over Quebec of French by the English-speaking pilots and air 
traffic controllers (1988: 155). 
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Well, we felt 
we were almost getting somewhere 
though how that place would differ 
from where we've always been, we 
couldn't tell you (p. 59) 
The poem's landscape is typically post-disaster, brought about by a 'joke or major 
quake' (line 7), the 'joke' indicating a deeply ironic tum of events. Two-Headed 
Poems shares the dangerous, post-disaster landscapes42 of The Circle Game and these 
landscapes are once again linked to subjects' bodies. In 'Marsh, hawk' (pp. 87-88), for 
example, a mass grave 'spreads on the I land like a bruise' (lines 7-8). 
After the disaster, 'everything' is 'falling south' into a 'dark pit' left after Cincinnati 
'crumbled' (lines 8-11). During the American Civil War, Cincinnati was a border 
town between those states that allowed slavery and those that did not. Mentioning 
Cincinnati literally includes Hegel's master and bondsman in the poem sequence. The 
south-north positioning also has particular resonance for the America-Canada 
relationship. Atwood uses the term 'Southern Ontario Gothic', which she says is 
similar to Southern Gothic, in an interview (in Brans, [1982] 2006:82). The presence 
of the grotesque, which is a characteristic of Southern Gothic, in the form of the two-
headed twins further complicates the pinpointing of the two 'sides', seeing that the 
poems ironically use a style of writing associated with the South to critique slavery. 
The poem communicates the collapse of civil society that had been constructed by 
symbolic language as well as by skewed relationships of power. In the aftermath of 
the disaster, one finds 'pieces of bureaucrats, used I bumper stickers, public names I 
returnable as bottles' (lines 13-15). The disintegration leads to economic 
42 In the first poem, 'Burned space' (p. 9), a forest fire 'twists the green I eternal into singed grey' (lines 
11-12). 
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disempowerment in the collapse of family businesses: 'So much for the family 
business. I It was too small anyway I to be, as they say, viable' (lines 24-25), a 
viewpoint that echoes in poem xi when the larger entity smugly remarks that 'no one 
can sing' in this other language, while he stands with 'one hand I in [his] small-
change pocket' (lines 1-3), withholding his small change from those whom he 
addresses. 43 
The collapse is of an identity that was constituted via language: after words were 
'stockpil[ ed]' in a 'cellar', people could be referred to this repository of identity: 
'Anyone asked us who we were, we said I just look down there' (lines 22-23). The loss 
or destruction of this language dissolves the subject into 'thin air' (line 33). Atwood's 
framing of the situation implies that language is cast as the other in a Hegelian 
dialectic. If the mirror of the other is made empty, the self is lost. The poem 
continues: 
But we weren't expecting this, 
the death of shoes, fingers 
dissolving from our hands, 
atrophy of the tongue, 
the empty mirror, 
the sudden change 
from ice to thin air. (p. 60) 
In the last stanza the speakers realize the cost of the loss of language, of the words 
they have been 'stockpiling' (line 19). It is functional that these words have been 
stored in a cellar, a dark enclosure similar to Kristeva's chora, indicating that there is 
an order anterior to symbolic language containing language that contributes to the 
forming of the subject. Without the reciprocal relationship between the secret 
language of the semiotic and the societal language of the symbolic, signification or 
43 McCombs's reading takes the crumbling of the family business in lines 24-26 to suggest the hitherto-
privileged English Canadians of Montreal (1988:154). 
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meaning is impossible- identity disappears into 'thin air' (line 33). Atwood's use of 
the empty mirror reminds one of the Lacanian mirror stage necessary for identity 
formation or self-representation, impossible for the symbolic self without the semiotic 
which, because of its role in subject formation, functions as the other of symbolic 
language. 
In poem ii (p. 61), the north and its use oflanguage is contrasted with the south: 
'Those south of us are lavish I with their syllables. They scatter, we I hoard' begins the 
poem. This hoarding mentality comes from the realization in poem i that the identity 
of the north is constituted by these collected shards of meaning. In poem i, the reader 
was told that '[o]ur fragments made us' (line 16). The poem suggests a fissure between 
entities, between a 'we' and a 'they', possibly between Canada and the United States 
whilst equating words with people: 'words, hearts, what's I the difference?' (lines 5-
6).44 Here, as in poem iii (p. 62), Canada is shown to be the common and disgruntled 
neighbour of the USA, trying to be polite and proper (lines 7-10), although it finds 
itself in an economically weaker position, similar to the speakers in poem i. Atwood 
uses wordplay on the words 'free market' in lines 11-13: 'Sneering is good for you I 
when someone else has cornered I the tree market'. This reference to trees picks up a 
line from 'The right hand fights the left' that tells how the stronger right hand 'blasts I 
another tree from its burrow' (lines 43-44). In this poem, as in 'The right hand fights 
the left', the tree as symbol of knowledge of semiotic processes, has been taken from 
the subjected. The poem ends with a veiled threat, presumably coming from the 
south: 'those who take risks I have accidents' (lines 16-17), in other words, do not risk 
44 McCombs reads 'Two-headed poems' as showing the development of a Canadian nationalist 
consciousness and points to the Canadas' defining themselves by first defining Americans in the first 
three lines of poem ii (1988: 154). 
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questioning the status quo of the current power relation nor try to gain access to the 
semiotic. 
The 'you' of poem iii is described in the same terms as the family around the dinner 
table one finds in poem iv of 'The circle game' (The Circle Game, pp. 41-42). At first, 
'you' seem like 'one I big happy family' (lines 1-2): 
We think of you as one 
big happy family, sitting around 
an old pine table, trading 
in-jokes, hospitable to strangers 
who come from far enough away. (p. 62) 
The prominent placing of the words 'one' at the end of line 1 and the image of the 
'happy family' (line 2) sitting around a table strengthen the apparent cohesiveness of 
this family, although this stanza already hints at cracks within this unit: the 'trading' 
of 'in-jokes' (lines ~), which suggests multiple parties bartering as if at a market, 
strengthens the economic implications of the sequence. Language is a form of 
currency: in-jokes are traded. These private jokes also imply the ability of language to 
exclude those who are not familiar with its codes or contexts. The family is friendly 
towards strangers 'who come from far enough away' (line 5), but ironically view their 
neighbours with contempt: 'As for us, we're the neighbours, I we're the folks whose 
taste I in fences and pink iron lawn flamingoes I you don't admire' (lines 6-9). 
In poem iv (p. 63) an investigator, who 'proclaim[s] his own necessity' (line 2), 'has 
come to clean your heart' (line 3). In the parenthetical stanza 4, the speaker suggests 
the violent purging that his investigations will bring about: '(Expurgation: purge. I To 
purge is to clean, I also to kill.)' . It seems as if the investigator would be examining 
'hearts' to see whether they are 'pure white' (line 4) or have been 'dirtied' or 'infected' 
by blood. Hearts filled with blood are likened to the use of words, presumably 
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employed to tell of a history that has been 'written in bones only' (line 13) up to now. 
These hearts break the silence that had been 'mistaken for no flag' and 'peace' (lines 
15-16) according to the last stanza. The bloodied hearts is a different kind of narrator 
or commentator on history than there had been in the past, and the investigator 
wants to censor their commentary. In staccato lines, as if the investigator is barking 
orders, he instructs in stanza 3: 'Stop this heart! I Cut this word from this mouth. I Cut 
this mouth'. 
In poem v (pp. 63-64), processes analogous to Kristeva's two modalities are most 
obvious. The power relationship between two nations is transferred to the realm of 
signification. Stanza 3 expresses the speakers' desire to revert back to a pre-symbolic 
'language': 
We wanted to describe the snow, 
the snow here, at the corner 
of the house and orchard 
in a language so precise 
and secret it was not even 
a code, it was snow, 
there could be no translation. (p. 64) 
McCombs takes this reference to a secret language to mean 'the newly articulate, 
noisily politicized quebecois intelligentsia' (1988: 155). However, the language 
Atwood writes about is 'not even I a code' (lines 16-17). It is therefore difficult to 
believe the Quebecois intelligentsia would choose to 'speak' in a mode that fights 
against signification: for without a code of shared meaning, signification is not 
possible. In stanza 2, the speakers mention 'a certain loss' (line 11) which they 
mentioned when talking about a 'certain light' (line 6)- this is the loss of signification 
as well. What the speakers desire here is the reactivation of the semiotic, its 
'meanings' not translatable into language, by the 'heterogeneousness' of poetic 
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language (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:101). What they are looking for is the (Tree of) 
knowledge of the semiotic. 
This 'secret language' (line 16) is similar to a 'native language' which, Atwood is 
quoted as saying, 'does not separate things into fixed objects, but lets them flow 
within their matrix', a concept that, Atwood says, is 'not even translatable in English' 
(McCombs, 1988: 159). I take this secret language to mean the language of the 
semiotic, where linguistic energies are not governed by the law of the symbolic. This 
language becomes visible when the semiotic overflows into the symbolic during 
activities such as the writing of poetry. The process in stanza 4 is similar to the poet 
attempting to invoke the semiotic: 
To save this language 
we needed echoes, 
we needed to push back 
the other words, the coarse ones 
spreading themselves everywhere 
like thighs or starlings. (p. 64) 
In the first stanza, the speakers had questioned their desire for a politicized dialectic 
('Is this what we wanted, I this politics' [lines 1-2]) which had turned out to be an 
oversimplification suggested by the 'flattened' (line 3) hearts, hearts having been 
likened to words in poem iv. As in The Circle Game, Atwood used flat images to 
signal the loss of any deep understanding. In this stanza, however, the 'want' for a 
dialectic as well as for a secret language in stanza 3 ('We wantedto describe the snow' 
[line 12, my stress]) is subtly turned into a need by repeating the phrase 'we needed' 
(line 20) in line 21. In order to activate poetic language, the 'coarse' (line 22) words 
from the language of the symbolic (which corresponds to the symbolic metal hand in 
'The right hand fights the left' [pp. 57-58] that spread itself like 'radar' [line 15] or the 
gaze of a 'tentacled silver eye' [line 16]) must be 'push[ ed] back' (line 21). 
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However, in stanza 5 there is once again a move away from poetic language. As in 
poem iv (which tells of the investigator's violent response to the hearts' outspoken 
retelling of their history and asserting their own consciousness) the speakers in poem 
iv do not want to settle for 'discarded I crusts and tom underwear' (lines 25-26). In 
the semiotic-symbolic model, 'discarded crusts' would mean the language of the 
semiotic which had been moved to the periphery and is kept there by the symbolic 
order perceiving it as worthless. The tom underwear might imply a violent sexual 
encounter, but can also be an image of poetic language, which is seated in the womb-
like chora, tearing through the defences of the symbolic and bubbling over into the 
language of the symbolic. 
Kristeva suggests that this overflow, this poetic language, has the ability to bring 
about societal change (Kristeva, [1975] 2002:94). Gorjup calls it a 'language capable of 
metamorphosis, offostering social change and growth' (2006:141). The last two 
stanzas of poem v show that a complete suppression of the semiotic in favour of the 
symbolic disempowers language: 
Our hearts are flags now, 
they wave at the end of each 
machine we can stick them on. 
Anyone can understand them. (p. 64) 
Similar to the pop-out flag of a toy gun that says 'Boom!', the speakers' hearts, likened 
to words, cannot change anything precisely because '[a]nyone can understand them' 
(line 31). Here, language is code and differs from the 'secret language' in stanza 3. Like 
all languages, these words are useful only for the following: 
They inspire pride, 
they inspire slogans and tunes 
you can dance to, they are redder than ever. (p. 64) 
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A seemingly patriotic statement is undermined by the frivolous 'tunes I you can dance 
to' (lines 33--34). These are not the rituals sang by the semiotic left hand in 'The right 
hand fights the left', but the purposelessness of dancing to the same tune. The 'hearts' 
or words that are now 'redder than ever' do not only suggest that language 
indoctrinates with 'slogans' (line 33) that are dangerous (the colour red signals 
bloodshed), but can also mean that the words are red with shame because they could 
not change anything. 
Poem vi (pp. 65-66) demonstrates the heterogeneity of poetic language: the speakers 
ask whether 'the sun II burns itself slowly out no matter I what you say' (lines 2--4). 
'[I]s that I so?' (lines 4-5) they ask and then give a scenario where a man is buried up 
to his neck in a desert. In an indented stanza mimicking the burial visually, the 
speakers use a technique similar to free word association to transform the sun from 
'whitehot' (line 6) to having ice on it (line 9). The churning out of the words matches 
up yet again with the regulatory processes of the chora (Kristeva, 1984:26): 
Close your eyes now, see: 
red sun, black sun, ordinary 
sun, sunshine, sun-
king, sunlight soap, the sun 
is an egg, a lemon, a pale eye, 
a lion, sun 
on the beach, ice on the sun. (p. 65) 
The paradox of the semiotic order meaning everything and nothing is found in the 
first line, where the 'you' is asked to close his/her eyes in order to see. McCombs reads 
the poem as a call for a 'Jaynesian return to the oracular right hemisphere of the 
mind' (1988:156).45 She explains that the truths of the oracular right hemisphere are 
able to transcend the antagonistic nationalisms of the two Canadas. Furthermore, 
45 By 'Jaynesian', McCombs refers to Julian Jaynes's Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the 
Bicameral Mind(1976). 
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McCombs sees the 'sun-spelling' of stanza 3 as a kind of invocation, what Jaynes 
would call an 'induced possession' (McCombs, 1988: 156). She explains that Jaynes 
theorized that 'under rationalism, the right-brain god-voices are no longer heard 
spontaneously; the oracles are vestigial and must be induced'. Thus, in the middle 
poem, this sun-spelling invokes the right-brain oracle. If the delirious man 'up to his 
neck in whitehot desert I sand' (line 6) were to invoke the oracular god-voices of the 
right hemisphere with his sun -spelling or incantation, the language he would bring 
forth would be a 'wet & living' language (line 12). This is the overflowing of the 
semiotic into the symbolic that takes place during delirium. 
The language that 'hangs around your neck' in stanza 6, is the language mentioned in 
the two last stanzas of poem v - the restricting rhetoric of the symbolic: 
Your language hangs around your neck, 
a noose, a heavy necklace; 
each word is empire, 
each word is vampire and mother. (p. 66) 
The image of the vampire that sucks out blood corresponds to the investigator in 
poem iv who cleans hearts or words 'dirtied' by blood, in other words, linked to the 
body and to the semiotic order. Stanza 6 establishes the duplicity of language: 
although each word is vampire, it is mother as well. Thus, although this ungoverned 
language of the semiotic could supply moisture and life to the man buried in the 
desert, it is destructive as well. 
The sequence progresses to poem vii (pp. 67-68), which gives further evidence that 
Atwood is using the contrasting voices of the twins to explore a semiotic-symbolic 
dialectic taking place in poetry. In this poem, the speakers tell of their 'leader', the 
two-headed poem that operates like a 'Siamese twin' (line 27): 'Our leader I is a man 
of water I with a tinfoil skin' (lines 1- 3). Whilst being a comment on spineless 
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political leaders, this is also a powerful image for the semiotic nature of poetry that 
nevertheless needs to be expressed in the words of the symbolic. The leader's body 
made up of water is a strong reference to the unconscious semiotic processes that 
must be harnessed and contained in poetic form for poetry to be written. The 
symbolic is once again likened to metal - it is the metallic right hand of 'The right 
hand fights the left', but here the symbolic is thin tinfoil, implying that it may rupture 
and bring forth poetic language at any moment. 
The two-headed poem speaks with two voices. Interestingly, it is the voices causing it 
to have two heads, not the other way around: 'He has two voices, I therefore two 
heads' (lines 4-5), which highlights Kristeva's theory that a theory of language implies 
a theory of subjectivity. It is the duplicity of semiotic-symbolic signification that 
transforms or splits the poem creature and gives rise to the split subject Atwood 
writes about in her book on writing and being a writer, Negotiating with the Dead 
(2002). 
Atwood uses the image of a spider that 'traps words' (lines 9-10). Spiders have proved 
successful images to describe poetry and the spinning of stories for other writers. 46 
Unlike the 'wet & living' mouths in poem vi, line 12, the leader's mouth devours the 
words: 'They shrivel in his mouth, I he leaves the skins' (lines 11-12). Like a corrupt 
politician, the poem hopes to satisfy his own wishes: 'Most leaders speak I for 
themselves, then I for the other people' (lines 13-15). Similar to the paper charm the 
speaker makes for her grandmother in poem iv of the sequence 'Five poems for 
grandmothers' (pp. 34-41) 'which is good I for exactly nothing' (lines 37-38), the 
speech of the leader in poem vii is shown to be useless for bringing about change. 
46 Walt Whitman's 'A noiseless patient spider' and Emily Dickinson's 'A spider sewed at night' are 
other examples. 
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Line 16 asks: 'Who does our leader speak for?' What follows is the core of the poem's 
dilemma: 'How can you use two languages I and mean what you say in both?' (lines 
17-18). This is the paradox of poetry: how does a poem express the poetic language of 
the semiotic in symbolic form? 
The semiotic and symbolic are held responsible for the dialectic in poetry and for the 
split in the subject who is constructed by language. Stanza 6 reads: 
No wonder our leader scuttles 
sideways, melts in hot weather, 
corrodes in the sea, reflects 
light like a mirror, 
splits our faces, our wishes, 
is bitter. (p. 68) 
Included in this stanza, is the reoccurring images and ideas of the mirror of the 
subject in the other but also of the flat surface without deep meaning that has been 
present since The Circle Game. The empty mirror in the first poem now shows a split 
of the speakers' faces. Language as other is absent in the first poem and therefore no 
subjectivity is possible. Here, however, language is shown to be split, leading to a split 
in the speakers' 'faces' (line 23) underscoring Kristeva's suggestion that a language 
theory is essentially a theory about the subject. Crab-like movements, here 
demonstrated by the leader, is shown to be a 'sound routine I for staying alive on 
edges', lines 16-17 of 'Landcrab I' (p. 12) in Atwood's next collection, True Stories 
(1981). The edge is the Kristevan abject and approaching it would be incestuous 
(Kristeva, [1975] 2002:104): a breaking of Lacan's law of the father. The suggestion 
here is that poetry moves towards the edge, towards the abjectival 'place where 
meaning collapses' (Kristeva, [1980] 2002:230), and then, crab-like, withdraws again. 
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Poem vii further admits that the two-headed monster was created by the speakers. 
Like a Frankensteinian creature, it was 'sewn from dead soldiers' (line 26). The words 
used to create the poem are loaded, these same words have been used by corrupt 
politicians to indoctrinate with the slogans in poem v, to subjugate and to make war: 
'each word is empire' states line 20 in poem vi. 'Why should we complain?' begins the 
last stanza of poem vii: 'He is ours and us, I we made him'. Similar to the complicity 
implied in the Hegelian bondsman's subjection, the speakers admit that the two-
headed poem is their creation. 
Poem viii (p. 69) is the first poem in the sequence where a singular 'I' speaks. The split 
in subjectivity, visible in the mirror of poem vii, now makes it possible for one twin to 
address its other. Like in 'The circle game', it seems that the more intimate the two 
parties' relationship, the harsher the power game: 'If I were a foreigner, as you say, I 
instead of your second head, I you would be more polite' (lines 1-3). Like the 
seemingly petty politics between neighbours in poem iii, poem viii shows that these 
two parties are not foreigners, instead they are 'the pressure I on the inside of the 
skull' (lines 10--11). They share a way of thinking, a consciousness, as they share a 
skull. The 'grudging love' (line 13) and 'old hatreds' (line 14) in poem viii echo the 
'ancient rage' (line 34) in the poem 'In my ravines' (The Circle Game, pp. 19-20) that 
alludes to the Oedipus story. The constituting of a subjectivity via a power relation is 
yet again underscored. The speaker asks in the last lines of the poem: 'Why fear the 
knife I that could sever us, unless I it would cut not skin but brain?' The twins are 
caught up in a power relation that would kill them if they were to break it. 
Similar to the leader of poem vii being a self-made creation, poem ix (pp. 69-70) 
makes it clear that you cannot use language without being complicit in its historic 
uses. The second-last stanza reads: 
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These words are yours, 
though you never said them, 
you never heard them, history 
breeds death but if you kill 
it you kill yourself. (p. 70) 
The poem personifies words and recites their deaths in a way similar to the naming 
rhyme 'This little piggy went to market' . Language, hanging like a noose or 'heavy 
necklace' around a neck in poem vi, lines 18-19, 'choked' (line 7) a word in the 
second stanza of poem ix. Other words were deported (line 9), buried (line 11) and 
dropped into a lake (line 14). However, according to the speaker, '[n]othing stays 
under I forever' (lines 21-22). Buried history and the suppressed consciousness it 
implies cannot be buried forever, seeing that they form a subjectivity- killing it off 
would be to kill off the self. 
The battle for power reaches its climax in poem x (pp. 71-72). Like the likening of 
words to hearts in poem iv, the hearts offered to the 'you' in the first stanza make the 
speakers' hands 'sticky with adjectives' (line 4) . The hearts on both sides 'hold snipers' 
(line 11). The strife which lies at the core of language is ignored: 'we refuse I to 
believe the secrets of our hearts' (lines 24-25), while language is still seen to be 
'virtuous' and 'plump with goodwill' (lines 28-30). Atwood uses the past tense to 
show that the language wars had already taken place and the landscape of the 
sequence is post-war: 
(Smoke and broken leaves, up close 
what a mess, wet red glass 
in the zinnia border, 
Don't let it come to this, we said 
before it did.) (p. 72) 
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The natural disaster in poem i is now a manmade disaster and the situation the 
speakers find themselves in, is generic. The reader is told that on the evening news 
the speakers 'listen to the war, the wars, I any old war' (lines 34-35). 
The last poem of the sequence, poem xi (pp. 73-74), offers a double language, similar 
to the poem 'The right hand fights the left'. A hard language, force-fed down the 
speakers' throats in stanza 3, is contrasted with a language which 'rises liquid' (line 
27) in song. In the first stanza, the speakers report a man's reaction to their language: 
'Surely in your language I no one can sing, he said, one hand I in the small-change 
pocket' (lines 1-3). The man seems to equate economical power with cultural 
superiority. He argues that the speakers' language is only good 'for ordering I the 
slaughter and gutting of hogs, I for counting stacks of cans' (lines 4-6). 'Leave I the 
soul to us', he remarks in line 7-8. 
The image of cages in stanza 3 calls up the 'cage of bones' in poem vii of 'The circle 
game' (pp. 42-44), a fixed subject position in which the woman speaker is entrapped 
by her lover's gaze. It also reminds the reader of the glass cage spun by the children in 
the same poem which suggested the ability of symbolic language to embody archaic 
tools of subjection, itself being such a tool. Poem ix of 'Two-headed poems' 
interrogates the accountability of contemporary speakers of a language to its historical 
misuses. In stanza 3 of poem xi, the speakers compare themselves to geese being force-
fed, their 'feet nailed to the floor' (line 10). The metallic language from 'The right 
hand fights the left' is present here in the nails keeping the geese from moving,47 
fixing them in a similar place than that of the woman in 'The circle game', who was 
fixed into a subject position by the 'cold blue thumbtacks' (line 45) of her lover's gaze 
47 In Negotiating with the Dead (2002:30-31) Atwood uses a similar image to talk about a split in the 
psyche of the author. 
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in poem iv (The Circle Game, pp. 39-40). The speakers 'are forced with nouns, nouns, 
I till our tongues are sullen and rubbery' (lines 12-13). In poem iv of 'The circle 
game', the lover memorizes proper nouns to keep 'places I in their proper places' 
(lines 30-31). These words however, fix subjectivities: they 'slow us, stumble I in us, 
numb us' (poem xi of 'Two-headed poems', lines 19-20). In sharp contrast to these 
nouns and the fixed subjectivities the act of naming imply, is the speakers' desire for 
'verbs' (line 26), which suggests process and movement and by implication a subject-
in-process: 'Our dreams though I are of freedom, a hunger I for verbs, a song I which 
rises liquid and effortless' (lines 24-27). A reconciliation with the semiotic, whose 
'liquid roots' ('The right hand fights the left', pp. 57-58, line 25) lie metaphorically in 
the amniotic fluid of the chora, is embedded in poem xi in the speakers' wish for 
'[their] double, gliding beside [them]' (line 28). The speakers seem to believe this 
reunion between the two languages will enable them to glide 'over all these rivers, 
borders, I over ice or clouds' (lines 29-30). Atwood will not reduce their complex 
power relation to a simple opposition: in stanza 3, language is said to be the disease as 
well as the cure: 'We see this language always I and merely as a disease I of the mouth. 
Also I as the hospital that will cure us, /distasteful but necessary' (lines 14-18). The 
poem offers another 'dream' or possibility to transcend this war: that of being 'mute' 
(line 31), with its implication of death, the termination of the subject also present in 
'The circle game'. 
Atwood brings the sequence to a cynical close: dreams of a reconciliation between 
these two forces 'are not bargains, I they settle nothing' (lines 32-33). The two parties 
remain trapped in the power relation of the circle game singing a different kind of 
song than they had wished for in line 26: 
This is not a debate 
but a duet 
with two deaf singers. (p. 74) 
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The last lines make the power play that much more tragic: both the master and the 
bondsman operate within a system that created them and which is bigger than the 
sum of its parts. Instead of offering a language similar to poetic language as a solution 
for the subjected, 'Two-headed poems' suggests an intriguing possibility: there are two 
voices here, and both can sing. The melody will be off-key, seeing that the two parties 
cannot hear each other. However, the jarring nature of the song disturbs the 
perceived harmony, the 'laws' of the music. This disturbance or flux undermines the 
status quo and holds the promise of change. In his overview of Atwood's poetry, 
Gorjup (2006: 142) suggests that any sense of wholeness in Atwood only comes in later 
collections. He writes that the poem 'After Heraclitus' in the collection Interlunar 
(1978) 'draws on that Greek philosopher's view of the universe as a place of ceaseless 
change, where opposites are harmonized through the creative energy symbolized by 
fire'. He calls the title poem from Morning in the Burned House (1995) 'a great 
metamorphic gesture through which Atwood dissolves barriers, synthesizes 
contradictions, resolves paradoxes, and collapses time and space' (Gorjup, 2006:143). 
Atwood's two-headed poems might find this pop-psychology 'closure' too clean-cut. 
What one does find in 'Two-headed poems' rather, is the subjected's uneasy use of 
symbolic language to negotiate relationships of power and her wish for poetic 
language to transcend these relationships. 
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Conclusion 
On the cover of Power Politics ( 1971), 
Atwood's fifth collection of poems, a woman 
dangles upside down, her one ankle tied to 
the wrist of a knight in full armour. The 
woman is wrapped in ribbon, like a 
mummy, with hair, like roots, touching the 
ground. The ribbon might be bandages - is 
she hurt? The obvious battle of the sexes 
aside, this cover can be read as a graphic 
depiction of the two languages in 'The right 
hand fights the left' from Two-Headed 
Poems. The knight is completely covered in 
armour while the woman seems rather 
Margaret Atwood 
defenceless. The cover resembles a tarot card, a conflation between the Hanged Man 
from the major arcana and one of the Knight cards from the minor arcana. However, 
Atwood knows that reversals, tarot cards that fall upside down, change the meaning 
of the cards. Although in lines 13-16 of 'My beautiful wooden leader' (in Power 
Politics, p. 7) the speaker says: 'you hold me by the left ankle I so that my head 
brushes the ground, I my eyes are blinded, my hair fills with white ribbons', the 
woman on the cover sees while the knight is blinded by his visor. The knight might 
also be in a considerable amount of discomfort. Somacarrera (2006:46) points to the 
pain the dangling woman is causing the knight's wrist and interprets her upside down 
posture as sirshasana, a yoga posture that focuses the mind. 
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The cover reinforces what Atwood's poems have been suggesting all along. Despite 
her simple slogan - 'Politics ... is everything that involves who gets to do what to 
whom' (quoted by Brans [1982] 2006:87)- subjectivity and subjection are complex, 
unstable concepts. In the poetry, Atwood's subjects renounce fixed subject positions 
in favour of a subjectivity similar to Kristeva's subject-in-process - a woman can 
switch places with the Hanged Man as on the cover. Although subjects are constituted 
'in primary vulnerability' (Butler, 1997:20), Atwood maintains that this does not 
redeem the subjugation of individuals and peoples, indeed, in the words of Butler, 'it 
makes all the more clear how fundamental the vulnerability can be' (Butler, 1997:20). 
The chosen poems in Chapters 3 and 4 expose the nature of the power relationships 
that shape the subject and govern his/her relationship with the other. The 
relationships are complicated - it is never a black-and-white affair only and people 
get hurt - but the cards may tum at any point. Many subjects, who appear to be 
subjugated, have access to means which could, in tum, be used to subjugate. The 
presence of a mode in language, referred to in the poems, which is similar to 
Kristeva's semiotic order, and the possibility of poetic language to rupture into the 
symbolic and bring about societal change, indicate that what is needed to fight the 
abuses of power may be available to all speaking subjects. While both parties in the 
Hegelian dialectic dream of freedom, the breaking of the circle game seems possible 
by the saying of an unknown word. The possibility of using the knowledge of poetic 
language to step out of the borders of the cards that were dealt you is Atwood's 
preoccupation. 
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